The following business bankruptcy-related papers, arranged by abstract ID number, can be downloaded from the Social Science Research Network:
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Univ. of Chicago Business School’s Joshua D. Rauh: "Risk Shifting versus Risk management: Investment Policy in Corporate Pension Plans." (Abstract ID: 931237)
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Univ. of Cambridge’s Geoff Meeks and J.G. Tulip Meeks: "Self-fulfilling Prophecies of Failure: The Endogenous Balance Sheets of Distressed Companies." (Abstract ID: 931096)
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Bartlit Beck Herman Palenchar & Scott LLP’s J.B. Heaton: "Solvency Tests." (Abstract ID: 931026)
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Chapman University School of Law’s Daniel B. Bogart: "Unexpected Gifts of Chapter 11: The Breach of a Director’s Duty of Loyalty Following Plan Confirmation and the Postconfirmation Jurisdiction of Bankruptcy Courts." (Abstract ID: 930161)
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University of Chicago Law School’s M. Todd Henderson: "Paying CEOs in Bankruptcy: Executive Compensation When Agency Costs are Low." (Abstract ID: 927081)
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Ohio State University Dept. of Finance’s Bernadette A. Milton: "How has CEO Turnover Changed? Increasingly Performance Sensitive Boards and Increasingly Uneasy CEOs" (Abstract ID: 924751)
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Yale Law School’s Yair Jason Listokin: "Paying for Performance in bankruptcy: Why CEOs Should be Compensated with Debt." (Abstract ID: 924569)
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Seton Hall University School of Law’s Stephen Lubben: "Choosing Corporate Bankruptcy Counsel." (Abstract ID: 781367)
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Abstracts for each of these papers follows:
As predicted here
I suppose that moment comes in everyone’s life. The first time someone calls you a “grandfather” (or the geriatric equivalent thereof). I faced that first reality check yesterday from, of all places, The Daily Bankruptcy Review, which ran
Today, glasses in some halls of Congress are probably clinking in honor of BAPCPA’s first birthday. But is America really better off? Are creditors really getting paid more because fewer consumers file for bankruptcy? The one major advantage to a bankruptcy case is that it’s a collective proceeding that minimizes the “agency” or collection costs that few unsecured (or deficiency) creditors would reasonably be willing to bear alone. At least in theory, therefore, bankruptcy provided enhanced recoveries for unsecured creditors by minimizing "collective action problems." Such rational thinking was a prime impetus behind passage of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, and most practitioners, Judges, and academics would tell you that this reasoning remains valid to this day. As neatly summed up by Professor Doug Baird in a great article entitled "A World Without Bankruptcy" (published at
In the end, I suspect that unsecured creditors as a whole will suffer from BAPCPA’s restoration of "collective action problems." Time (and some very much needed academic research) will tell. In the meantime, we’ll instead send our happy birthday wishes to Chicago’s own
Here are the "Picks of the Month" for September 2006, my monthly guide to recently published articles of relevance to the bankruptcy practitioner, scholar, student, and Judge:
Many have anxiously awaited more updates to my BAPCPA outline. But every time I’m about to turn to another section, some new decision, argument, or news bit distracts me from posting additional sections. At the rate things are going, and given the increasing cacophony of case law, the present outline soon will become as dated as a baby boomer at a high school reunion.
Practitioners before the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals know that oral arguments in that Court can sometimes go well (e.g., by following the guidelines set forth in Question 4
Here are the "Picks of the Month" for August 2006, my monthly guide to recently published articles of relevance to the bankruptcy practitioner, scholar, student, and Judge: