Thanks to our friends at the Delaware Litigation Blog, for letting us know of Professor Ribstein’s works and Professor Bainbridge’s works on the fiduciary duties of directors in the “zone of insolvency.”
Along these lines, I also highly recommend a recent article reviewed at the NCBJ entitled “Deepening Insolvency,” authored by J.B. Heaton (partner at Barlit Beck Herman Palenchar & Scott LLP). This well-researched article, published in the Spring 2005 issue of The Journal of Corporation Law (vol. 30, no. 3), provides an excellent summary of the development and current state of “this theory of corporate injury.” In this article, Heaton writes:

Deepening insolvency theories originated in efforts to avoid imputing the wrongdoing of corporate directors and officers to a bankrupt plaintiff corporation by invoking the so-called “adverse interest exception” [to the in pari delicto doctrine], evolved to a theory of standing and damages, and finally “morphed” into an independent cause of action. (Citing In re Global Service Group LLC., 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 1702, at *11 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., 11/4/04) (recognizing that “[w]hat began as a justification for recognizing the ‘adverse interest’ exception soon morphed into a theory of recovery”)).

Steve Jakubowski
© Steve Jakubowski 2005

Last Wednesday, the Office of the Circuit Executive for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit selected four men to serve in the open slots finally created for Delaware’s grossly understaffed Bankruptcy Court (which for nearly 15 years had been denied the addition of permanent judges primarily, in my view, because of fear by out-of-state lawyers/lobbyists that enhancing Delaware’s ability to handle premiere cases would adversely impair their out-of-state, big city practices). The four are:
Kevin Gross, Rosenthal Monhait Gross & Goddess
Brendan Shannon, Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor
Kevin Carey, Bankruptcy Judge of the Eastern District of PA
Christopher Sontchi, Ashby & Geddes
The Office of the Third Circuit Executive is now taking comments on the qualifications of these designates through December 1st, and decide soon thereafter. For those who know the candidates personally, I hope that you take the time to send in your comments.
The Bankruptcy In$ider had this to say about their backgrounds, Delaware’s woefully understaffed bankruptcy bench, and the selection process generally:

Continue Reading Movin’ on Up, Finally! — Long Overdue Selections to Delaware’s Overworked Bankruptcy Court Announced

In Allen v. J.K. Harris & Co, LLC, 2005 WL 2600205 (E.D. Pa., 10/12/05), a state court consumer class action seeking damages based on unfair trade practices was removed by the defendants to federal district court following the plaintiff/debtor’s filing of a chapter 13 petition for relief. The plaintiff/debtor then moved to remand the case back to state court.
The district court considered whether abstention is mandatory under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2), which says that courts “shall abstain” from exercising jurisdiction over an adversary proceeding where a party timely moves for abstention based on a state law claim that does not arise in the bankruptcy case and could be “timely adjudicated” in the state forum.
In noting the split among the circuits as to whether the doctrine of mandatory abstention can be applied to an already removed case, the Court (indicating that the Third Circuit has not decided the matter) sided with the majority view that the doctrine of mandatory abstention may be applied to a removed proceeding. The Court stated:

Continue Reading Mandatory Absention of a Removed State Court Action: A New Case Reviews the Split Among the Circuits

As all bankruptcy practitioners know, lawyers are increasingly being held accountable for losses suffered by their bankrupt clients. To meet the blogosphere’s demand for quality legal postings, the Coleman Law Firm has developed a second blog, The Illinois Legal Malpractice Blog (www.illinoislegalmal.com). The blog is moderated by my colleague Cassie Crotty, who quickly understood the great potential of blogging, and developed a zeal for it. Given her talents, the blog is sure to be a great one. Please stop by the site and add it to your RSS feeds. You’ll be glad you did!
Steve Jakubowski
© Steve Jakubowski 2005

In In re Virissimo, 2005 WL 2854341 (Bankr. D. Nev., 10/31/05), Judge Linda B. Riegle of the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada sided with Judge Robert Mark, Chief Bankruptcy Judge of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida, in the debate (referenced here) between Judge Mark and Arizona’s Judge Haines regarding whether BAPCPA’s limitation on the homestead exemption, as set forth in § 522(p) to the Bankruptcy Code, limits the amount that a resident debtor can claim as exempt as “homestead” property under state law if the debtor has not owned the property for more than 1215 days and did not previously own property in the state.
Judge Riegle summarized the debate between Judge Haines and Judge Mark as follows, ultimately concluding that Judge Mark had the winning argument:

Continue Reading BAPCPA’s Homestead Exemption: A Third Judge Weighs In on the Debate

The old phrase “Don’t Mess with Texas” rings true in today’s ruling from the Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of Texas, In re Hubbard, (2005 WL 2847420) (Bankr. S.D. Tex., 11/2/05), where the Court denied a chapter 13 debtor’s request to extend the time to provide verification of credit counseling.
This mandatory requirement that consumer debtors seek the advice (in all but emergency situations) of credit counseling firms in advance of their filing for bankruptcy is a slithering outgrowth of BAPCPA, and is embodied in new section 109(h) of the Bankruptcy Code. Being the first opinion on the matter, the Court said it “will interpret § 109(g) in accordance with traditional principles.”
This case makes clear that lawyers and debtors should expect bankruptcy judges to hold a debtor’s feet to the fire and require it to follow BAPCPA’s rigid credit counseling guidelines. In sum, a tighter squeeze.
Here’s what the Court said, uncensored:

Continue Reading Don’t Mess with Texas: Texas Bankruptcy Court Denies Request for Extension of Time to Provide Verification of Credit Counseling

The strong feedback to recent posts (here and here) (including by our friends at The Volkoh Conspiracy) regarding the unjust windfall to bankruptcy estates from Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 1 (1931), led us internally to discuss which would more likely occur first: hell freezing over or the US Supreme Court overturning Moore v. Bay?
The answer being painfully apparent, we searched for a better mousetrap, and seized upon Congressional action as the preferred solution to the problem of Moore v. Bay. Just as Congress in 1994 enacted the much-heralded “Deprezio Amendment” to address the inequities of a much reviled (though correctly decided) Seventh Circuit decision, Congress should enact a “Moore v. Bay Amendment” to bury this widely-criticized, but universally followed, opinion.
We at The Bankruptcy Litigation Blog, therefore, posit for your consideration the following brainteaser:
HOW CAN THE BANKRUPTCY CODE BEST BE AMENDED TO FOREVER BURY THE HOLDING OF MOORE v. BAY?
The NCBJ (National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges) begins tomorrow in San Antonio, Texas, and I hope to get some good ideas down there on how to best solve this brainteaser. Meanwhile, any suggested concepts to consider, pitfalls to avoid, or language to employ would be most appreciated and duly recognized.
Stay tuned. Much more to follow (no pun intended).
Finally, thanks to all 2,100 visitors to the site in the first three weeks of the blog’s existence. Knowing you’re out there spurs us on (no pun intended, San Antonio)! Hopefully, this blog will continue to exceed our wildest expectations, and yours.
Thanks again for your support!
Steven Jakubowski
© Steve Jakubowski 2005

Here’s our weekly roundup of significant recently decided cases involving complex bankruptcy disputes for the week ended 10/30/05.
In re MDIP, Inc., (2005 WL 2792358) (Bankr. D. Del., 10/26/05)
In re Women First Healthcare, Inc., (2005 WL 2737436) (Bankr. D. Del., 10/21/05)
In re DSC Ltd., (2005 WL 2671314) (E.D. Mich., 10/19/05)
In re Skorich, (2005 WL 2811899) (Bankr. D.N.H., 10/19/05)
In re Center For Advanced Mfg. & Technology, (2005 WL 2660275) (Bankr. W.D. Pa., 10/19/05)
In re TW, Inc., (2005 WL 2671531) (Bankr. D. Del., 10/14/05)

Continue Reading Notable Reported Cases for the Week Ended 10/30/05

Back in the early to mid-1990’s, while Conseco’s profligate CEO, Steve Hilbert, was on his way to becoming America’s highest paid CEO (with a whopping $277 million between 1991 and 1996), Hilbert was (forever?) smitten with the lovely 25 year old Indy stripper Tomisue Tomlinson as she jumped out of a cake at his stepson’s bachelor party.
Unlike Hilbert’s five previous marriages, this one has survived the test of time (and loss of money). Conseco’s bankruptcy appears to have joined them at the hip (or maybe the prepetition asset transfer to Tomisue did), as evidenced by a recently decided case in Conseco’s post-confirmation bankruptcy saga, here involving the rights of the Hilberts’ “irrevocable trusts” to four “split-dollar” life insurance agreements established in 1998. In re Conseco, 2005 WL 2737507 (N.D. Ill., 10/18/05).
Under these self-dealt policies, Conseco agreed to pay annual premiums owing under the policies (worth between $12.5 million and $25 million each). The Hilberts were also required to pay a portion of the policy premiums (presumably the minimum required to maximize tax benefits). If the Hilberts failed to pay their portion, the trusts could pay on their behalf. The Court noted that the Agreements had early termination provisions if Conseco went bankrupt, or if the Hilberts or their trusts failed to pay Conseco a share of the premiums. Upon termination, the trusts could repurchase the policy from Conseco by reimbursing Conseco for premium payments made. If, within 60 days, the trusts did not exercise this repurchase option, Conseco could either become the owner of the policy or surrender the policies and get its premium payments back.
In December 2001, Conseco stopped making payments on the insurance policies, believing the Hilberts owed Conseco millions of dollars in defaulted D&O loans. Apparently, after Conseco stopped making payments, the trusts responded by converting the policies into paid-up policies with lower death benefits so that no further payments were due under the insurance policies.
One year later, Conseco filed for bankruptcy, and on September 10, 2003, it’s reorganization plan went effective. Notably, neither the Hilberts nor their trusts exercised their option to purchase the policies from Conseco within 60 days of the bankruptcy filing, but rather filed claims against Conseco in the bankruptcy case seeking damages for alleged breach of the Agreements. (Perhaps they were thrown off by the ipso facto clauses in the Agreements that provided for termination in the event of bankruptcy, which every bankruptcy lawyer knows will not alone terminate an executory contract.)
The trusts asserted in their proofs of claims that Conseco’s bankruptcy filing did not terminate the Agreements. Conseco objected to the claims, smartly asserting that the Agreements were not executory, and thus were terminated because neither the Hilberts nor the trusts exercised their option to purchase the policies from Conseco within 60 days of the bankruptcy filing (the ipso facto clause notwithstanding). In September 2004, Conseco’s attorneys advised the trusts that the Agreements were terminated and that Conseco intended to enforce its rights to recoup the premium payments made. Counsel for the trusts responded that the trust “would consider your taking of the cash value of the policies not only to be an additional breach of the [Agreements], but also to be conversion as well.”
The Bankruptcy Court, however, disagreed with the trust counsel’s assessment, holding that the Agreements were not “executory contracts” under Bankruptcy Code section 365, and thus were automatically terminated when Conseco filed for bankruptcy in December 2002. The Bankruptcy Court also found that “because Conseco was not attempting to enforce a contract, its material breach of the Agreements in December 2001, when it stopped making premium payments, was of no consequence.”
The District Court, reviewing the bankruptcy court’s rulings and conclusions of law de novo, ruled that the bankruptcy court correctly adopted the “Countryman definition” of an exectuory contract as one in which “the obligation of both the bankruptcy and the other party are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing performance by the other.” (Citing Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 Minn L. Rev. 439, 460 (1973)). The District Court also concurred with the Bankruptcy Court’s logical extension of the Countryman definition in concluding that “if any of the parties’ duties is deemed immaterial, then the contract is deemed not executory.”
As regards whether a contract is “executory,” the District Court noted the split in the circuits between the majority Countryman “material breach” test and the minority “functional test” (with the Seventh Circuit following the Countryman definition), stating as follows:

Continue Reading What Makes a CEO Perk Executory and the Circuits’ Split Over the Definition of an Executory Contract