Though its origins are murky, the slang phrase "duck soup" is typically understood to mean "a piece of cake" or "something that is easily done." 

The Marx Brothers made the phrase famous in their movie Duck Soup, which Roger Ebert calls "probably the best" of the Marx Brothers’ movies (though contemporary audiences apparently didn’t think so).  

In hearing of New York Bankruptcy Judge Burton Lifland’s ruling that denied Dana Corp.’s proposed incentive plan for its executives as a disguised retention plan prohibited by BAPCPA’s new Code section 503(c) — and his statement  in open court that "this compensation scheme walks like, talks like, and is a KERP" — I was reminded (speaking of "movies with corporate themes") of the opening segment in Duck Soup where Groucho Marx, as the newly inaugurated dictator/president of bankrupt Freedonia (or perhaps, more aptly, "Free-Dan-[i]-a"), outlined his own bonus incentive plan in the movie’s opening sequence:

I will not stand for anything that’s crooked or unfair
I’m strictly on the up and up
So everyone beware
If anyone’s caught taking graft
And I don’t get my share
We stand ’em up against the wall
And pop goes the weasel.

You’ll find some good early commentary on Judge Lifland’s decision here (WSJ Blog),  here (CFO.com), here (Boss & Workplace Blog), here (Bankr. & Restr. Blog), here (Credit Slips Blog), and here (Credit Slips Blog).  As noted here (in connection with his successful mediation of the dispute in the Enron bankruptcy over Stephen Cooper’s $25 million "success fee" request), Judge Lifland is no stranger to compensation fights.  Indeed, his legendary experience on the bench makes his decision all that much more signficant.

Given the ease with which Calpine Corporation’s proposed incentive plan sailed through Judge Lifland’s court only four months earlier, Dana’s advisers (as reported here) "had been confident they would prevail, in large part because … the Dana pay package was modeled on one adopted [in] Calpine."  In approving the Calpine plan, Judge Lifland commented from the bench:

Well, based upon this record, and it’s certainly clear to the court that these plans and agreements are proposed in good faith and based upon appropriate business judgment. Further, the record before me validates that the focus of the plans and agreement is to maximize value for all the estates; the plans are apparently designed as incentive plans as opposed to retention or KERP’s.

I do find, based upon this record, that the prohibitions of Section 503 have, if not been avoided, are not applicable based upon the structure of these plans and the agreements. To the one area where there might be potentially an argument to be made that 503(c) would be applicable, that would be in the supplemental plan, but that does not involve insiders, and I think 503(c)(3) is appropriately analyzed to agree with that.  In short, I do agree that these are incentive plans to bring enhanced value into the estate. They are not retention plans, although anyone can always make an argument that if people are made happier than they were before, then they are excited enough to stay with the company, but that’s not the focus of these plans. And this would be clearly, based upon this record, not KERP’s and they are not in violation of 503(c). And I will approve the appropriate orders submitted.  (See Transcript at pp. 84-85.)

Here’s a copy of the order entered by Judge Lifland in the Calpine bankruptcy case, to which the approved Calpine incentive plan is attached as Exhibit A.  For the sake of completeness.  Here also you’ll find the Debtor’s motion to approve the incentive plan, the sole objection filed by a small, outgunned Calpine shareholder, and the Debtor’s reply in support.  At the near "rubber-stamp" hearing approving the plan, Judge Lifland heard offers of proof from Scott Davido, Calpine’s CFO/CRO, and Nick Bubnovich, a senior consultant from Watson Wyatt (who also provided some benchmarking testimony), as well as statements in support of the incentive plan from Akin Gump’s Mike Stamer on behalf of Calpine’s Official Unsecured Creditors’ Committee.

Approving Dana Corp.’s proposed incentive plan, however, proved to be anything but "duck soup" for veteran bankruptcy lawyer Corinne Ball and her legions at Jones Day in this hotly contested proceeding.  Instead, Judge Lifland wrote in striking down Dana’s proposed compensation arrangements, "if it walks like a duck (KERP), and quacks like a duck (KERP), it’s a duck (KERP)."  In re Dana Corp., 2006 WL 2563458 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 9/5/06) (pdf).  He continued:

The Completion Bonus includes an amount payable to the Executives upon the Debtors’ emergence from chapter 11, regardless of the outcome of these cases. Without tying this portion of the bonus to anything other than staying with the company until the Effective Date, this Court cannot categorize a bonus of this size and form as an incentive bonus. Using a familiar fowl analogy [see "duck" quote above], this compensation scheme walks, talks and is a retention bonus. Contrary to the contentions of several objectors, however, the language of section 503(c)(3) does not prevent this Court considering a Compensation Motion using the business judgment rule….

The Debtors have failed here to meet their burden of demonstrating that the payments in exchange for signing a non-compete agreement and other payments do not constitute “severance” for purposes of section 503(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, or that the evidentiary requirements contained in section 503(c)(2) have been satisfied.

In explaining why he approved a comparable plan in Calpine’s bankruptcy case, but would not do the same in Dana’s, Judge Lifland remarked:

The Debtors also compare the compensation programs brought before other courts, in other cases, including the plan brought before this Court in In re Calpine. If this Court is to analyze the Compensation Motion pursuant to section 503(c), the Court must look to the specific circumstances of these cases, and these Debtors. A significant aspect of these cases, in the context of the Compensation Motion, are the issues raised in the strong objections filed by several parties in interest, including the Creditors’ Committee, Equity Committee and United States Trustee and therefore, the Compensation Motion cannot fairly be compared to other compensation motions brought before this Court or other courts. Finding support in this Court’s bench ruling in In re Calpine is misplaced as in that case there was a prima facie case and record to support the application for an "incentive” that was largely unrebutted, therefore not raising the issues currently before this Court.

Or, put another way, "fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me."

For those interested, below you’ll find links to all the pleadings (with exhibits) filed by Dana and the objecting parties in connection with the matter.  Taken as a whole, they make for some fascinating and enlightening reading:

Continue Reading Duck Soup: NY’s Judge Burton Lifland Nixes Dana Corp.’s “Incentive” Plan for Its Top Six Executives

The following bankruptcy history-related papers, arranged by abstract ID number, can be downloaded from the Social Science Research Network:

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American University’s Mary Hansen and Univ. of Mary Washington’s Bradley Hansen: "Path Dependence in the Development of U.S. Bankruptcy Law, 1880-1938." (Abstract ID: 909294)

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Rutgers University’s Paul J. Miranti Jr. and Drexel University’s Nandini Chandar: "Information, Institutions and Agency: The Crisis of Railroad Finance in the 1890s and the Evolution of Corporate Oversight Capabilities." (Abstract ID: 899415)

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UW-Madison’s Jodi L. Bellovary and Marquette University’s Don E. Giacomino and Michael D. Akers: "A Review of Bankruptcy Prediction Studies: 1930 to Present." (Abstract ID: 892160)

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Abstracts for each of these papers follow:

Continue Reading Recent Bankruptcy History-Related Articles of Interest Available for Downloading from SSRN

With chapter 11 filings at the lowest level in 10 years, the world awash with liquidity, and default rates at historic lows, a recent post on the excellent Econobrowser blog last week caught my eye when it suggested that recent yield-to-maturity data "yields a probability-of-recession estimate of 44.3%."

Yesterday’s Reuters news bulletin, pointing to a study released yesterday by the Federal Reserve Bank of NY, further confirmed that the future may not be quite as rosy as present default rates (or, alternatively, bankruptcy lawyer billable hours) suggest.

This study, authored by Arturo Estrella (senior vice president in the Capital Markets Function of the Research and Statistics Group at the Federal Reserve Bank of NY) and Mary Trubin (former economist at the FRB who is now on track to get a Ph.D. in economics at Northwestern U.), concludes that a curve inversion lasting at least three months can signal a recession 12 months before it actually happens.  According to the study, the minimum spreads between three-month and 10-year yields ranged as much as -3.51% prior to the August 1981 to November 1982 recession, to as small as -0.08% before the August 1990 and August 1991 recession.

Thus far, according to yesterday’s news release, 3-month yields have exceeded 10-year yields since mid-July.  The 10-year/3-month spread is presently about -0.26%.

Place your bets!

© Steve Jakubowski 2006

The following bankruptcy finance-related working papers, arranged by abstract ID number, can be downloaded from the Social Science Research Network:

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Brandeis University’s Jens Hillscher and Harvard University’s Jan Szilagyi: "In Search of Distress Risk." (Abstract ID: 917567)

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FDIC’s Michael Kimminger: "The Evolution of U.S. Insolvency Law for Financial Market Contracts." (Abstract: 916345)

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Seton Hall Univ. School of Law’s Stephen Luben: "Credit Derivatives & the Future of Chapter 11." (Abstract ID: 906613)

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Stockholm School of Economics’s Stefano Rossi and Stockholm University’s Nicola Gennaoli: "Bankruptcy, Creditor Protection and Debt Contracts." (Abstract ID: 891154)

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Northwestern University’s Vadim Linetsky: "Pricing Equity Derivatives Subject to Bankruptcy." (Abstract ID: 889973)

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University of Mainz’s Gunther Friedl: "Discussion of ‘Optimal Debt Service: Straight vs. Convertible’." (Abstract ID: 899299)

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Penn. State Univ.-Berks’s Khaled Abdou and Univ. of New Orleans Oscar Varela: "The Role of Venture Capitalists in Bankruptcy." (Abstract ID: 891642)

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University of Aarhus’s Peter Tind Larsen: "Default Risk, Debt Maturity and Levered Equity’s Risk Shifting Incentives." (Abstract ID: 887441)

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University of Chicago Law School’s Kenneth W. Dam: "Credit Markets, Creditors’ Rights and Economic Development." (Abstract ID: 885198)

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Univ. of Georgia’s Mark Dawkins and Linda Smith Bamber and SMU’s Neil Battacharya: "Systematic Share Price Fluctuations after Bankruptcy Filings and the Investors who Drive Them." (Abstract ID: 881508)

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Abstracts for each of these papers follow.  More importantly, thanks to all who expressed their condolences to me during the past week regarding my mom’s recent passing.  Your support provided a source of much comfort to me.

Continue Reading Recent Bankruptcy Finance-Related Articles of Interest Available for Downloading from SSRN

Unexpectedly, and far too swiftly, my mother passed away, and today was her funeral.  My sister, Ruth Jakubowski, a Baltimore County Circuit Court Judge, asked me to deliver the eulogy on behalf of the family.  This morning, I delivered this eulogy in her honor.

While reserving my right to retract this post, I have decided — at the end of the day — to post my eulogy to her in hopes that it inspires you, the reader, to live each moment to its fullest until your very last breath, just as my mother did.

In the one-year mourning period that follows, please forgive me if I don’t blog for a while with quite the intensity I have in the past.

Thanks for reading, and for your continued support.

© Steve Jakubowski 2006

Elementary courtroom etiquette, and indeed an absolute tradition in Supreme Court argument, requires counsel to first address the Court with the customary respectful opening of, "May it please the Court." 

The lone bankruptcy-related case before the US Supreme Court this coming term will resolve a split in the circuits (previously referenced here) regarding whether a chapter 7 debtor has an absolute right to convert under Bankruptcy Code section 706(a) from chapter 7 to chapter 13, or whether that right is subject to an exception for motions filed in "bad faith."  In so doing, the Court will expound upon the precise statutory meaning of "may" in Bankruptcy Code section 706(a) (which provides that a debtor "may convert a [chapter 7] case to a case under chapter 11, 12, or 13 … at any time").  Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., No. 05-996 (Argument Date:  11/6/06).

Last week, the chapter 7 debtor-petitioner, represented by Boston’s David Baker, filed its opening brief (pdf / WL), and the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys (NACBA), led by WilmerHale’s Seth Waxman and Craig Goldblatt, chimed in with a supporting amicus brief (pdf / WL).

The case began inauspiciously, as many cases that land in the Supreme Court do, when the debtor-petitioner’s flooring business hit the wall in 2003.  Being unemployed, the debtor was ineligible to file for chapter 13 reorganization, and was limited to filing a chapter 7 liquidation.  He subsequently landed a  job, however, and then moved under Code section 706(a) to convert his case to chapter 13.  The bankruptcy court refused to let him do so, finding that the motion was filed in "bad faith."  The bankruptcy appellate panel (pdf/WL) and the First Circuit (pdf/WL) affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision.

As recounted in this prior post, the Supreme Court last term surprised many by deciding that the "plain meaning" of a bankruptcy statute must be filtered through a prism that, "in the main, secure[s] equal distribution among creditors [and] take[s] into account, as well, the complementary principle that preferential treatment of a class of creditors is in order only when clearly authorized by Congress."

In Marrama, the Court will consider whether provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that seemingly provide a debtor with an absolute right to do something should be filtered through yet another lens, one that screens for the absence of "bad faith."  With supposed rampant debtor abuse of the Code’s liberal "fresh start" provisions purportedly serving as the primordial mover behind Congressional passage of BAPCPA (though Texas’s Judge Frank Monroe explains the real reason here), we’ll see whether such an animus also moves the Justices to hold that a debtor must be free of "bad faith" if it is to take advantage of seemingly unrestricted permissive rights granted in the Code.  Stay tuned.

For those interested in the arguments advanced in the opening briefs, you’ll find below the table of contents of the briefs filed by both the debtor-petitioner and NACBA:

Continue Reading May It Please the Court? The US Supreme Court to Soon Decide Whether a “Bad Faith” Debtor “May” Do as the Bankruptcy Code Pleases

The following business bankruptcy-related articles, arranged by abstract ID number, are available for downloading from the Social Science Research Network:

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Chapman University School of Law’s Daniel B. Bogart: "Liability of Directors of Chapter 11 Debtors in Posession: ‘Don’t Look Back – Something May Be Gaining on You’." (Abstract ID: 918814)

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ASU’s Michael G. Hertzel and Zhi Li, USC’s Micah S. Officer, and NYU’s Kimberly J. Rodgers: "Inter-firm LInkages and the Wealth Effects of Financial Distress along the Supply Chain." (Abstract ID: 912795)

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UCLA Law School’s Lynn M. LoPucki and Joseph W. Doherty: "Rise of the Financial Advisors: An Empirical Study of the Division of Professional Fees in Large Bankruptcies." (Abstract ID: 913841)

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Mathias Hild and University of Virginia’s Matthew R. McBrady: "A Managerial Primer on the US Bankruptcy Code."  (Abstract ID 912038)

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Bennett Stewart: "The Real Reasons Enron Failed." (Abstract ID: 911690)

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3d Circuit Judicial Law Clerk Adam Levitin: "Finding Nemo: Rediscovering the Virtues of Negotiability in the Wake of Enron." (Abstract ID: 910571)

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University of Virginia’s Gerry Yeman and Marian Chapman Moore and UT-Austin’s Geraldine R. Henderson: "Snibbie®: Spit Happens(B)." (Abstract ID: 910114)

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Yair Jason Listokin: "Is Secured Debt Used to Redistribute Value from Tort Claimants in Bankruptcy? An Empirical Analysis."  (Abstract ID: 909225)

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University of Virginia’s Patricia H. Werhane and Julie Stocker: "Dow Corning Corportation(A): Breast Implant Design." (Abstract ID: 908143)

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University of Virginia’s Patricia H. Werhane:  "Dow Corning Corportation(B): Making A Decision." (Abstract ID: 908725)

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University of Virginia’s Patricia H. Werhane: "Dow Corning Corportation(C): Closure?" (Abstract ID: 908726)

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UCLA School of Law’s Lynn M. LoPucki and Joseph W. Doherty: "The Determinants of Professional Fees in Large Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases Revisted." (Abstract ID: 906184)

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Seton Hall University School of Law’s Stephen Lubben: "The Other Liquidation Decision."  (Abstract ID: 903399)

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Univ. of Kentucky College of Law’s Rutherford B. Campbell Jr. and Christopher W. Frost: "Managers’ Fiduciary Duties in Financially Distressed Corporations: Chaos in Delaware (and Elsewhere)." (Abstract ID: 900904)

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3d Circuit Judicial Law Clark Adam Levitin: "Rough Justice? The Nature and Limits of Equitable Subordination." (Abstract ID: 900444)

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Lousiana State Univ.’s Susan Kalinka: "In Re Ehmann: Bankuptcy Court Decision Portends Problems for Manager-Managed LLCs." (Abstract ID: 894571)

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Boston College’s Mauricio Soto, Alicia H. Munnel, Francesca Golub-Sass, and Francis Vitagliano: "Why are Healthy Employers Freezing Their Pensions?" (Abstract ID: 893214)

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Federal Reserve Board’s Daniel M. Covitz, Song Han, and Beth Anne Wilson: "Are Longer Bankruptcies Really More Costly?" (Abstract ID: 891486)

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NYU’s Kimberly J. Rodgers, Indiana Univ.’s Randall A. Heron, and Univ. of Iowa’s Erik Lie: "Financial Restructuring in Fresh Start Chapter 11 Reorganizations." (Abstract ID: 890693)

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Michael Nwogugu: "Structural Changes in the US Retailing Industry and Legal, Economic and Strategy Implications for the US Real Estate Industry." (Abstract ID: 883568)

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University of Virginina’s Samuel E. Bodily and Robert F. Bruner: "Enron: 1986-2001." (Abstract ID: 302155)

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Harvard Business School’s Michael Jensen: "Active Investors, LBOS, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy." (Abstract ID: 244152)

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Abstracts for each of these papers follow:

Continue Reading 22 Recent Business Bankruptcy-Related Articles of Interest Available on SSRN

Last year, in a post entitled "What Makes a CEO Perk Executory and the Circuits’ Split Over the Definition of an Executory Contract," I reported on an interesting sideshow to the Conseco bankruptcy involving the rights of Conseco’s exhigh flying ex-CEO Stephen Hilbert (and his enterprising wife, Tomisue Tomlinson) to four self-dealt "split-dollar" life insurance policies worth $87 million in the aggregate.  As noted in my prior post, Chicago’s Judge Robert W. Gettleman ruled that Chicago’s Bankruptcy Judge Carol W. Doyle was right in concluding that the policies were not "executory contracts" and were automatically terminated when Conseco filed for bankruptcy in December 2002.  He also agreed with Judge Doyle’s conclusion that "because Conseco was not attempting to enforce a contract, its material breach of the Agreements in December 2001, when it stopped making premium payments, was of no consequence."

Last Friday, the 7th Circuit affirmed Judge Gettleman’s decision, with Indiana’s own Judge Michael S. Kanne authoring the opinion on behalf of a unanimous panel.  Dick ex rel. Amended Hilbert Residence Maintenance Trust v. Conseco, Inc. (In re Conseco, Inc.), 2006 WL 2328635 (7th Cir. 8/11/06) (pdf). 

In affirming the lower courts’ rulings, the 7th Circuit made two important general statements regarding executory contracts in bankruptcy.  First, regarding when a contract is executory, the 7th Circuit stated:

Recognizing that the literal definition would render nearly all agreements executory, we determined that in order to effectuate Congress’s intent, § 365 should be applied only ‘to contracts where significant unperformed obligations remain on both sides.’  In other words, a contract is executory if each party is burdened with obligations which if not performed would amount to a material breach.  (Citation omitted.)

Second, as to what law applies in determining whether "the remaining obligations are significant," the 7th Circuit stated that the court should look to state law (and in this case, Indiana law) for answers.

Applying these general principles to the case, the 7th Circuit concluded on de novo review that the split-dollar policy agreements were not executory, reasoning as follows: 

Continue Reading 7th Circuit Rejects Ex-CEO Hilbert’s Claim that Certain of His Perks Were Executory When Conseco Filed Bankruptcy

Last December, I reported here on NY Bankruptcy Judge Stan Bernstein’s "must read" opinion in Chartwell Litigation Trust v. Addus Healthcare, Inc. (In re Med Diversified, Inc.), 334 B.R. 89 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2005) (pdf), in which he barred the defendants’ valuation expert, Scott Peltz, from testifying in a $7.5 million fraudulent transfer case, finding both that Mr. Peltz failed to qualify as a business valuation expert and that his testimony was unreliable "because he did not employ the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the field of business valuation."

With no one left to rebut the plaintiff’s proposed valuation expert, one would have expected that the post-confirmation litigation trust would be laughing all the way to the bank, but last week, in this written opinion, Judge Bernstein put a pox on the plaintiff’s house by equally ripping the plaintiff’s expert, Robert Cimasi, and finding that his testimony and report also were "fundamentally unreliable."  Chartwell Litigation Trust v. Addus Healthcare, Inc. (In re Med Diversified, Inc.), 2006 WL 2242288 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 8/2/06).  In reaching this conclusion, Judge Bernstein pulled no punches, writing:

Continue Reading “A Pox On Both Your Houses”: NY’s Judge Stan Bernstein Next Tosses Plaintiff’s Business Valuation Expert in Another “Must Read” Decision