UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In re:		Chapter 11	
ENRON CORP, et al.,		Case No. 01-16034 (AJG) Jointly Administered	
	Debtors.		
ENRON CORP.,			
	Plaintiff,	Adversary Proceeding No. 03-92677 (AJG)	
v.		1101 02 72017 (110 0)	
J.P. MORGAN S	SECURITIES, INC., et al.,		
	Defendants.		
		/	

REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

The Moving Defendants¹ submit this reply memorandum of law in support of their Motion to Compel Production of Documents (the "Motion to Compel") by Goldman, Sachs & Co. ("Goldman") concerning Goldman's involvement, role and/or participation in Project Truman between August and December 2001.

INTRODUCTION

On May 1, at a pre-motion conference, this Court found that the discovery sought by the Moving Defendants is relevant and appropriate and that Goldman's efforts to limit that

¹ Kelly Properties, Inc. ("Kelly"), Veritas Software Investment Corp. ("Veritas") and the UBS Defendants ("UBS") (collectively, the "Moving Defendants").

discovery were not appropriate. Transcript of Proceedings (May 1, 2007) ("May 1 Tr."), at 4 (Opening Brief ("Br."), Ex. A). Consistent with its pattern of tactical delay, Goldman ignored the Court's guidance and continued to refuse to produce the requested documents, prompting the instant motion.

More than a month has passed since the Court advised Goldman that the Project Truman documents should be produced. Yet, in its Opposition Memorandum (the "Opposition Brief"), Goldman sets forth no new facts or arguments, relying instead on the same points it previously presented with respect to the pre-motion conference. These arguments failed then and fail now to justify Goldman's refusal to produce the information sought, and this Court should grant the Motion to Compel and order Goldman to produce immediately all documents relating to Project Truman.

ARGUMENT

I. THE REQUESTED DOCUMENTS ARE RELEVANT TO GOLDMAN'S ALLEGED AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH ENRON

In this litigation, Goldman has asserted the affirmative defense that it acted solely as an agent and conduit in the commercial paper ("CP") transactions such that it is not an initial transferee of Enron. This defense is relevant vis-à-vis Goldman's position to Enron and to Goldman's position relative to other defendants, including the Moving Defendants. The complete picture of the Enron CP buybacks, including whether Goldman actually was acting as Enron's agent, cannot be understood without knowing the extent of Goldman's role in Enron's decision-making and the reasons that Goldman demanded an agency agreement from Enron that

only appears to have been signed after the CP buybacks began. The Project Truman documents are central to this inquiry.²

Goldman's claim that it has produced all Project Truman documents relevant to agency is nothing new, <u>see</u> April 17, 2007 letter of Goldman Sachs at 4; nor is Goldman's claim that Project Truman documents it has chosen not to produce have "nothing to do with the agency agreement between Enron and Goldman Sachs" (Opp. Br. at 20; <u>see also</u> May 25, 2007 letter of Goldman Sachs at 2; Transcript of Proceedings (April 19, 2007) ("April 19 Tr.") at 17, 38-39 (Attached hereto as Exhibit 1)). As before, the problem with Goldman's argument is that under the Federal Rules, other parties do not have to take Goldman's word on these issues.

Evidence on the timing of the agency agreement's negotiation and execution raises questions about the nature of Goldman's relationship with Enron in the period leading up to the CP transactions. As the Moving Defendants demonstrated in their opening brief, there is evidence to suggest that high level executives of Goldman and Enron discussed the concept, terms and conditions of the alleged agency agreement in a Project Truman meeting on the same day that the CP prepayments commenced. Deposition Exhibit 30,482 at 1; Deposition Exhibit 30,487 at 1 (Br. Ex. J, K). The Moving Defendants are entitled to the full range of Project Truman documents to investigate this and other connections between Project Truman and Goldman's alleged agency.

Despite Goldman's simplistic assertions to the contrary (i.e., there is an agreement, therefore Goldman is an agent), the question of whether Goldman acted as Enron's

² As the Court ruled at the May 1 pre-trial conference, documents regarding Project Truman limited to the one week time period before the CP buyback commenced are not sufficient. (May 1 Tr. at 4).

³ The fact that Goldman has offered nothing new underscores the tactical nature of its actions. Goldman sought the full 20 days to respond even though it had nothing to add to its prior arguments.

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agent in the CP transactions is very much an open issue in this litigation. Goldman's lengthy but incomplete recitation of the discovery to date does not account for record evidence that suggests Goldman did not perform at least some of the transactions as agent. The record shows, for example, that Goldman and Enron executed the agency agreement on October 28, 2001, two full days after the CP prepayments began, and after many defendants, including some of the Moving Defendants had already sold CP back to Goldman. See Dep. Ex. 40,126 (Opp. Br. Ex. 6); UBS01185-86 (Attached hereto as Exhibit 2). Goldman also has pointed to no evidence suggesting that the Moving Defendants in any way knew about Goldman's alleged special status when they agreed to sell CP back to Goldman on October 26, 2001, or that Goldman had negotiated that special status at a time when it was undertaking a project to save Enron from the dire financial straits that enveloped it. To the contrary, the evidence suggests that the Moving Defendants were not informed of any alleged agency status when they sold their CP to Goldman. See Federica Colombi Dep. Tr. at 68:17 – 69:20, 128:7-11; Sandra Galac Dep. Tr. at 155:18-156:10; Mary May Dep. Tr. at 119:8-120:17; Michael Markowitz Dep. Tr. at 79:3-9 (Attached collectively hereto as Exhibit 3). Under these circumstances, it is by no means a foregone conclusion that Goldman's alleged agency is valid or enforceable. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.03 cmt. f (2006) ("[A]pparent authority is not present when a third party believes that an interaction is with an actor who is a principal."). Thus, Goldman's assertion that there "is not a single piece of evidence in the record" to suggest that Goldman did not perform the transactions as agent (Opp. Br. at 7), begs the question since Goldman has studiously withheld relevant discovery concerning Project Truman.

II. THE REQUESTED DOCUMENTS ARE RELEVANT TO WHETHER GOLDMAN BENEFITED FROM THE CP TRANSACTIONS

The Project Truman documents are relevant to whether Goldman benefited from the CP transactions, as the Moving Defendants demonstrated in their opening brief. (Br. at 6-7). This Court has already acknowledged that discovery is appropriate about whether a defendant is liable as a beneficiary of the transfers at issue. In re Enron Corp., 2005 WL 3873891, at *2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2005). If Enron had defaulted on its CP, Goldman faced potential liability from its customers, such as the Moving Defendants. See, e.g., Franklin Savings Bank v. Levy, 406 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (finding Goldman liable to its customers for the value of defaulted Penn Central commercial paper). The Court cited this authority in finding the Project Truman documents relevant. May 1 Tr. at 3-4.

Goldman's Opposition Brief offers nothing new on this issue. <u>Compare Opp. Br.</u> at 20-28 <u>with April 19 Tr.</u> at 20-22, 39; May 23, 2007 letter of Goldman Sachs at 2. In its misplaced attempt to re-argue the merits of a benefit theory, Goldman ignores this Court's prior rulings and that this is not a summary judgment motion.

Goldman argues that: (i) it did not receive any tangible benefit that it could disgorge; (ii) no one at Goldman believed there was a possibility of liability based on a potential CP default by Enron; and (iii) Enron did not intend to benefit Goldman in any respect when it transferred buyback funds to investors. (Opp. Br. at 22-27). Each of these factual arguments is based on an incomplete record. There are at least three more deposition cycles during which the parties can discover what Goldman employees believed or knew, including based on information in the Project Truman documents. More importantly, the factual record on this issue is incomplete because Goldman has not produced Project Truman documents regarding its

relationship with Enron in the months before the CP transactions. Goldman's arguments on the merits are therefore premature and have no bearing on this discovery motion.

In addition, even on the incomplete record that exists, there is a sufficient predicate for the Moving Defendants' requests for all the Project Truman documents. The record suggests that funds that flowed through Goldman's accounts were used to retire CP for which Goldman might otherwise have been liable. See Gredd v. Bear, Stearns Secs. Corp., 359 B.R. 510 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding Bear Stearns benefited from funds that flowed through the firm and allowed it to cover positions for which it otherwise would have been liable). In order to determine whether Goldman would have had such liability, it is critical to discover what Goldman knew about Enron's creditworthiness and when Goldman knew it.

The record also raises relevant questions that Project Truman documents reasonably may be expected to answer. Goldman points out, for example, that it "did not receive any compensation of any kind from Enron or any other entity in exchange for its services as Enron's agent in the buyback transactions." (Opp. Br. at 23). Since Goldman is not a charitable organization, why then did it provide these services? If Goldman performed the CP transactions for free because of an anticipated benefit related to Project Truman, then the Moving Defendants are entitled to discover that. Similarly, Goldman argues that its CP desk was "walled off" from its investment banking area and that no confidential information would have passed between the two. (Opp. Br. at 18). As the Moving Defendants demonstrated in their opening brief, there is already record evidence that such confidential information may have passed through Goldman's Chinese Wall. See Br. at 4-5; GS ENRON-CP08030 (Br. Ex. I); Deposition Exhibit 30,482 at 1; Deposition Exhibit 30,487 at 1. Whether Goldman's knowledge of Enron's dire straits reached the CP trading desk itself, may or may not be relevant to why, at very senior levels, Goldman

decided to hurriedly procure an agency agreement from Enron, but, in any event, is a factual question that must be determined on the evidence rather than on Goldman's unsworn and unsupported statements in a brief.⁴

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above and in the Moving Defendants' opening brief, the Moving Defendants respectfully request that the Court grant the Motion to Compel and order Goldman to produce immediately all documents relating to Project Truman.

Dated: June 12, 2007 Respectfully submitted,

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
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⁴ Given that there is no claim that the Project Truman documents are uniformly subject to some privilege, Goldman's suggestion that they be reviewed *in camera* makes no sense. (Opp. Br. at 2). Moreover, Goldman's request appears to indicate that it already knows the universe of documents to be produced, which runs counter to its argument that producing the documents presents a burden. (Opp. Br. at 5). Similarly, Goldman's admission that Project Truman was "brief" and a "discrete process" belies the suggestion that the requested discovery is "expansive." (Opp. Br. at 1-2).



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2	x	Case Nos.
	In re	01-16034(AJG)
3		(03-02677)(03-92682)
	ENRON CREDITORS RECOVERY CORP.,	
4	et al,	New York, New York
5	Reorganized Debtors.	April 19, 2007 2:09 p.m.
5	reorganized Debtors.	2:09 p.m.
6	DIGITALLY RECORD	DED PROCEEDINGS
	(Proceedings J.P. M	
7	2:00 (03-92677) Enron Corp. v. J.P.	_
	al.: Discovery Conference.	
8	(03-92682) Enron Corp. v. Mass Mutu	al Life Insurance Co., et
	al.: Discovery Conference.	
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10	BEFORE: THE HONORABLE ARTHUR J. GONZALEZ	,
10	United States Bankruptcy Judge	<u>i</u>
11	United States Dankingtey Sudge	
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	DEBORAH HUNTSMAN, Co	ourt Reporter
23	(212) 608-9053 (718) 774-	_
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24	Transcript Produced by	y Court Reporter
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(Whereupon, the following is an excerpt from the proceedings taken on 4/19/2007 in In re Enron Corp., et al, Case No. 01-16034.)

JUDGE GONZALEZ: Please be seated.

Where is counsel for Kelly, UBS, and Veritas?

MS. KOVSKY-APAP: Your Honor, Deborah Kovsky-Apap of Pepper Hamilton on behalf of Kelly Properties, Inc.

MR. LAW: Your Honor, Kenneth Law of Bialson, Bergen & Schwab on behalf of Veritas Software Investment Corp.

MR. PELL: Your Honor, Owen Pell from White & Case on behalf of the UBS Defendants.

JUDGE GONZALEZ: All right. We will proceed with counsel for Pepper Hamilton. Go ahead.

MS. KOVSKY-APAP: Your Honor, we are sort of surprised that we have to be here on yet another discovery dispute. The rules of the Deposition Protocol Order seem very clear, and especially after the last conference about Mr. McGee, it just seems clear that Goldman Sachs is flouting the rules in refusing to provide dates for Mr. Hurst. Additionally, document discovery is very clear as well. It really doesn't matter what Goldman Sachs alleges the facts are. What matters is that the moving parties in this case have clearly demonstrated that the discovery that we are seeking is relevant to claims and defenses in this litigation. Goldman Sachs' refusal to comply with our discovery requests is simply

inexcusable.

Goldman Sachs' letter to the Court is remarkable. In that letter they have essentially made an argument on the merits. They are arguing that since in their version of the facts they are completely innocent of everything and they don't need to produce documents. According to Goldman Sachs, these documents must be irrelevant to the facts in the case, because they are telling us what those facts actually are. We feel that the point of discovery is that we don't need to take their word for that. We are entitled to discover that for ourselves.

For the reasons that were stated in the moving parties' letter, as well as in the letter submitted to this Court by Enron yesterday, it really appears that the Project Truman documents are relevant to this litigation. They are relevant to Goldman Sachs' claim of agency. They are relevant to the defenses available to Goldman Sachs. They are relevant to what Goldman Sachs knew prior to Enron's drawing on its bank lines and to the buyback transactions. We are entitled to understand the context of those events and what was going on. These documents and this discovery that we are seeking are relevant, because we believe that Goldman Sacks is concerned based on the Penn Central case that if Enron defaulted on its commercial paper, Goldman Sachs was going to be liable to its customers. We want to understand what

Goldman Sachs' motivation was in that week of October 22nd through the 26th when they stopped trading Enron commercial paper, when they demanded to act solely as agent. We tried asking these questions in the deposition of Robert Wall.

We believe that Goldman made a decision to trade what they perceived as high litigation risk for a low preference risk, and then tried to avoid that preference risk altogether by acting as agent and basically dumping on their customers.

We believe that we are entitled to discovery on this issue, because it goes to Goldman Sachs' potential liability in this case. Additionally the documents and witnesses that we are seeking may be our only or our best source of information regarding what was going on at Enron during this time period. Most of the high-level Enron witnesses that we would otherwise be able to speak to are in prison, pleading the Fifth, or dead. That is another reason why we are entitled to this discovery and why we need it.

I want to address a few of the points that Goldman Sachs brought up in its letter to this Court. Goldman Sachs argued that certain of the moving parties failed to meet and confer with Goldman Sachs as required. But Kelly Properties met and conferred with Goldman Sachs on several occasions on this very issue -- whether Goldman Sachs would produce all Project Truman related documents -- and Goldman Sachs simply stonewalled. It would have been redundant --

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JUDGE GONZALEZ: Goldman Sachs also said, I thought, that you had never formally requested the documents?

MS. KOVSKY-APAP: Kelly Properties requested certain documents related to Project Truman, and in our meet and confer we asked very broadly whether they intended to produce all documents related to Project Truman such as those that had been requested by Enron.

Goldman Sachs has previously objected to other parties' document requests on the basis that they are duplicative of other parties' requests. Under the discovery procedures in this case, we didn't believe it was incumbent on us to submit duplicative requests, but rather could rely on requests submitted by other parties, particularly since that is the position that Goldman Sachs itself has taken.

JUDGE GONZALEZ: But the problem that may arise or the problem I think could have arisen is you don't request them. You sit down with Goldman and you say, "Are you going to produce the records or documents, et cetera, that Enron requested"; and they say, "No." Goldman has raised the issue of your standing to attempt to enforce that request. Effectively that is what is going on. You didn't ask for them in your formal request, and you decided that you wouldn't duplicate Enron's formal request. Thus, it then falls to Enron to enforce the request and not to you, unless you have made the request yourself.

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MS. KOVSKY-APAP: Your Honor, I would argue that it does not fall to us. Goldman Sachs can't have it both ways. They can't object to document requests submitted by parties on the basis that they are duplicative of other parties' requests, and then refuse to produce documents because we didn't submit a duplicative request. It simply doesn't make sense.

JUDGE GONZALEZ: All right. Go ahead.

MS. KOVSKY-APAP: Regarding the issue of the meet and confer, I just wanted to say that it would have been redundant and futile for every moving party to line up and have the same pointless conversation with Goldman Sachs after it had been made clear that they were not going to be responsive to any requests that we were making relating to Project Truman.

Goldman Sachs also tried to argue that Deutsche Bank and UBS apparently are not entitled to the discovery that the UBS Defendants are seeking, because they are Defendants in the Newby Securities Litigation Case. But Goldman Sachs failed to note to the Court that Deutsche Bank and UBS have been dismissed out of that case, while Goldman Sachs --

JUDGE GONZALEZ: Speak slower. Go ahead.

MS. KOVSKY-APAP: Goldman Sachs seems to be making an argument to the Court that the UBS Defendants are not entitled to this type of discovery, because the UBS Defendants are defendants in the Newby Securities Litigation Case. Goldman

Sachs failed to note to the Court that UBS has been dismissed out of that case, while Goldman Sachs is still in it. I would further submit that it is completely irrelevant whether the UBS Defendants are also defendants in another case. That has nothing to do with the relevance of Project Truman-related discovery to this litigation, relevance that has been aptly established both by the moving Defendants and by Enron itself. I think it is telling that even the Debtor in this case believes that this is discovery that is necessary.

Goldman Sachs argues that it has already produced Project Truman-related documents. First, it has only produced a mere handful of documents, some of which are not even clearly related to Project Truman. The production is obviously incomplete, and Goldman Sachs itself limited its production to what I believe is has characterized as Project Truman documents relating to the CP Transactions from October 22nd onward. That is not what has been requested and that is not sufficient.

Now, there aren't a whole lot of complicated issues here. It seems very straightforward. The discovery that we are seeking is relevant. The parties are entitled to this discovery. Even the Debtor has joined us in seeking the documents and the depositions. We are not required to take Goldman Sachs' word for it that their version of the facts is the correct one, and we respectfully ask the Court's

assistance in this matter.

JUDGE GONZALEZ: All right. Thank you.

Is there anyone else with respect to either UBS or Veritas, and then I will hear from Enron.

MR. LAW: No, Your Honor. On behalf of Veritas this is Kenneth law. I believe our position has been aptly presented to the Court by counsel.

JUDGE GONZALEZ: All right. Thank you.

MR. PELL: I would agree with that for UBS, Your Honor. This is Owen Pell.

JUDGE GONZALEZ: All right. Thank you.

Enron?

MR. SCHATZOW: Your Honor, Michael Schatzow of Venable LLP on behalf of Enron. We will be very brief, Your Honor.

We did ask for the documents specifically, and we have been discussing them in meet and confers with Goldman that began in January of 2006. We did ask for deposition dates. We nominated both of these people, Mr. Gieselman and Mr. Hurst, on October 6, 2006. We don't come to this Court, Your Honor, as soon we have a disagreement. We try to work things out. I am sure we are here on discovery disputes more than we would like to be and more than the Court would like us to be here, but given the number of Defendants in this case and the number of discovery disputes, we haven't been here all that often. We did ask for this. We asked for it a long time

ago, and the fact that we haven't been able to resolve it brings us here now.

In terms of the deposition dates, you resolved a remarkably similar dispute with Lehman just about a month or so ago. Counsel for Goldman were here in the courtroom when that was argued. We think the same result should apply. I think we have been offered dates for Mr. Gieselman. They should give us dates for Mr. Hurst. After Mr. Gieselman's testimony, if they want to file a motion for a protective order, they can file a motion for a protective order, they can file a motion for a protective order, if they have some basis to think that we are not entitled to his testimony. We are happy to deal with that on the merits.

We are now in the seventh of eleven plan cycles, Your Honor, for depositions. Given the lead time for scheduling, if we wait until Mr. Gieselman testifies; then we have to first request dates from Mr. Hurst, and we have no assurance that we are going to get a date, because, after all, we asked for a date for Mr. Hurst in October of 2006, all that does is force us into a position to come back to the Court to extend the discovery deadlines, which nobody wants to do, if we can avoid doing it.

So while we are not the ones who brought this, Your Honor, we do have the grievance, we do have the standing, we have done the asking, and we would urge Your Honor to allow Kelly and the others who have made the request to file a

formal motion, if Goldman is not willing to produce the documents. The relevance of the documents is spelled forth in not only the papers that have been submitted to Your Honor, but in the argument today. It goes to many, many different issues in the case, including agency status, beneficiary status, commercial paper, and insider knowledge. There are a host of issues that these documents go to, and we don't really think that we can advance the ball without the Court's help at this stage, Your Honor. Thank you.

JUDGE GONZALEZ: All right. Thank you.

Goldman?

MR. MOLONEY: For the record, Tom Moloney on behalf of Goldman Sachs & Co. I am with Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP.

Your Honor, I am glad we were able to come down here. We did conclude Mr. Wall's deposition, who was the head of commercial paper trading at Goldman Sachs. It was two and a half days of deposition that concluded today. We have so far concluded six Goldman witnesses, 11 additional ones have been scheduled, and five are in the process of being scheduled to give you some context of what type of discovery we have voluntarily provided. There is no issue about that whatsoever.

Fortunately, Your Honor, there is a record for some of this, because if there wasn't it would be hard for you to

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figure out that most of what you have been told is rubbish. If you look at our letter -- I don't know if you have it in front of you, Your Honor. If you look an Exhibit A -- we were down in Dallas on February 5th and 6th and also 7th and 8th disposing Mr. Newgard, the primary witness for Enron. While we were down there, we talked -- Mr. Schatzow and I -- about the issue of the Project Truman discovery and also Mr. Murphy, Ms. Kovsky-Apap's partner, was there, and she may have been participating by phone or she got the information secondhand about the discussion. So she wrote an e-mail to me and said, "Please write down exactly what you have proposed to do." This was on February 6th. We said, "We will make Mr. Gieselman available for deposition, which we have done, and we also said Mr. Hurst is very senior, and so we would like you to take Mr. Gieselman first. But if you want Mr. Hurst after Mr. Gieselman, we will give you a date for him."

This is unlike the Lehman situation, where Lehman says they don't want to ever produce the person. This was before Your Honor's ruling, but it is basically following the spirit of Your Honor's ruling, which is, please start with a less senior person and, if, after you finish it, we will make Mr. Hurst available. We never said we would not. We also said, in terms of what we would make available in terms of documents, is all documents created by the so-called Project

Truman team related to commercial paper or to buyback, and that includes all documents related to the drawdown of the revolver.

When I proposed that to Mr. Schatzow, he said, "Well, in the last week Goldman had people down in Houston talking to Enron. There were investment bankers talking to Enron in the week of October 22nd through October 26th, and that may be our only source of information." I said, "Okay. I will produce all documents reflecting any communications with Enron on matters wherever it deals with commercial paper and anything else for the period of October 22nd to October 26th."

Now, what Mr. Schatzow didn't tell you, Your Honor, is that after I sent this e-mail out, we, in fact, did this. We produced all these documents. We gave them a day for Mr. Gieselman, and until the letter was written by his partner Mr. Wilkins last night, which wasn't even sent to me until I asked for it, I did not hear the word boo from Enron that this wasn't fine. I didn't get a phone call saying, "Sorry, Tom. What we worked out in Houston is no longer operative. Sorry, Tom. We want a date for Mr. Hurst." We have had endless meetings with scheduling committees. Not once did they raise this question. They are not going to be able to point to a single e-mail and they are not going to be able to point to a single conversation where they let us know that what we

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suggested to them was not appropriate and fine.

Now, they have jumped on the bandwagon when Kelly Properties raised this issue, but Kelly Properties doesn't have standing to raise this issue. We are not asking it for both ways. What we are saying is, "Look, if somebody served a document request on us and we are producing the documents, then we shouldn't have to produce them again pursuant to a second document request, because this is a central source of documents and you are going to get them anyway. We are not saying that, if we object to someone's producing a document, you can't serve a request and then move to compel. That is your prerogative.

But it can't be that every time I work out an issue with one of the Defendants in their case regarding their document production or at least think I have worked it out in good faith or believe that I have worked it out, that then any single Defendant can second guess what I have worked out with the other Defendant.

JUDGE GONZALEZ: One second. But they could under your structure, had they put in a formal request?

MR. MOLONEY: Certainly. That would put me on notice to hold on, and people have done that. It is not like they haven't served two formal requests on us. UBS has served a formal request on us and Veritas has served a formal request. It is not like they are just relying on Enron. So I can't

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negotiate with them their requests, and then if Enron for some reason doesn't like what I work out with Veritas, I have got to back to Enron. I have 50 Defendants. We would never get to ground zero. I would never know when I have worked something out, if I can't figure it out that, when I have worked out something or at least think in good faith I have worked something out with the party who has served the request, it is resolved.

Now, the other thing is she referred to the Newby case. First of all, we never said UBS was a Defendant in Newby and we never said Deutsche Bank was a Defendant in Newby. We said UBS is actually a Defendant in the swap case and Your Honor knows that, because that is before you. said UBS is a Defendant in a companion securities cases to the Newby case, which it is in point of fact; and we said Deutsche Bank was a Defendant in the MegaCase, but she missed the point of the letter. The point of view is that -- and I will get to this when I get to the main argument -- if we are going to conduct collateral state of mind discovery on the issues of what people's state of mind is, whether Goldman Sachs as an institution has more knowledge about Enron than UBS did, than Deutsche Bank did, and than Citibank did, then we are off and recreating the Newby case here in the case where we already have in seven cycles 85 deposition through today. The idea of morphing the case in essence so that we are recreating Newby

means that we are never finishing this case. This case is already preposterous. The idea that they are deposing 22 Goldman witnesses already under the preference fraudulent case that we are really litigating here, rather than litigate something that is totally irrelevant, I think that is our point and that is the point we are trying to make there.

Putting aside whether we were sandbagged by Enron in terms of not going through a reasonable meet and confer process once we thought we had reached an agreement on February 6th in terms of our production, leave that aside and just look at the merits of what they have asked for, and I think the first point is Hurst is not an issue. If they want a date for Hurst, we will give them a date for Hurst. They have never asked for it before. It is inappropriate for them to come to this Court without having actually asked us for a date. I don't think it is actually that practical to give them a date. He is not going anywhere. After we finish Gieselman, we will sit down and we will work out a real date.

What happens is we come up with hypothetical dates and then circumstances change, and they want to take someone else's deposition. For the Vice Chairman of Goldman, I cannot give them a hypothetical date. If they really think they need that deposition, he is going to have to clear out his schedule and I am going to have to find a time that is really reasonable to do that in hopefully a very short period of

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time, given the fact that Gieselman was at the exact same meeting that Hurst was. Gieselman himself was a managing director of Goldman and a partner of Goldman. So it's not like they are not getting a senior person. But Hurst we can work out.

Why do they need Project Truman documents beyond the ones that we have offered to give them, given what this case is really about? This is a preference case which Your Honor has recognized is basically mechanical. We would get money within 90 days. Was there a settlement payment so that we have a protection there? Did we act as agent as to that? There is an agency agreement they signed. I don't understand why they keep on saying "so-called agency agreement" or why they keep on saying "so-called agency defense." We have a signed agreement. We know from the discovery that has taken place so far that Enron's principal officers acknowledged that Goldman was acting as agent for Enron. We know from the discovery taken so far that it wasn't Goldman's idea to act as agent or do this transaction. Enron did ask us to do this, because they wanted to accomplish this transaction. That we know already.

So this idea that they want to go looking for Project Truman information is not based on agency. There is nothing about agency that would come about as a result of looking through Project Truman.

JUDGE GONZALEZ: Go ahead.

MR. MOLONEY: There is a draft engagement letter which

They say that we misrepresented that there was a signed agreement, but if you actually look at their letter, Exhibit D, Your Honor, in their letter, you will see something that says "Goldman Sachs," dated September 21st. It is a letter, Exhibit D.

JUDGE GONZALEZ: You are saying D or B?

MR. MOLONEY: D as in dog.

JUDGE GONZALEZ: It is Exhibit D to?

MR. MOLONEY: To Enron's letter, the Venable firm's letter.

JUDGE GONZALEZ: September 21st?

MR. MOLONEY: Right. If you read the first paragraph of that letter, Your Honor, it says: "I am prepared to furnish you with certain confidential proprietary information in connection with the potential engagement of Goldman Sachs & Co. in connection with the [Enron's] consideration." This is not an engagement letter, Your Honor. If you go on and look through the next couple of pages, this is not an engagement letter. This was a letter given to Goldman Sachs for discussions they would have preliminary to an engagement, and they would keep that information confidential. There is a draft engagement letter, if I could approach the bench, Your Honor?

Enron produced.

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JUDGE GONZALEZ: I may be incorrect with this, but doesn't this letter state that Goldman would receive -- whether they did or not is a separate issue -- confidential information along with the engagement letter before the engagement actually may be executed? It is to consider whether or not the parties will reach some agreement and there will be an engagement. But prior to the actual execution of the engagement letter, it seems to me that this letter anticipates Goldman's receiving confidential information during those preliminary discussions?

MR. MOLONEY: I agree with that, Your Honor. The letter basically protects the possibility of Goldman's getting confidential information before the engagement letter is signed. In fact, the letter you have before you, which was a draft engagement letter, provides for a fee of \$250,000 per quarter and then various potential success fees for deals, and it provides for a scope of services and to expect that an engagement letter would and it has an indemnity agreement. Ιf you look at the signature page, this letter did not get signed. As a factual matter, the reason why it didn't get signed is that as the discussions went forward as to whether or not Goldman was to receive confidential information, Goldman said that we need to be able to share this with other business units and Enron said, no, you are a competitor.

So they never reached an agreement on a modified version or reiteration of this confidentiality agreement. As Mr. Fastow testified for the United States Government in the trial of Kenneth Lay, we never got negative confidential information about Enron. This was not me testifying. The government of the United States put Mr. Fastow on the witness, and that is what he said and that is what is in the transcript. That "we never did open our kimono to Goldman Sachs. We never signed their engagement letter. We never gave them confidential non-public information."

Now, it so happens that in the very last week for our purposes, which is the week before October 26th, Enron did approach Goldman Sachs again -- and you can read about this in books, it is in the books about Enron -- and they wanted Goldman to be one of the advisors along with Citibank and I think J.P. Morgan Chase to provide financing for them and also the service advisor for a potential Dynegy merger, and Goldman Sachs said no and was kicked out of Enron's office on Saturday, October 27th. Goldman said, "We don't want to provide this financing. Goodbye." That is public knowledge. They are not going to dispute that. That was in the "Wall Street Journal" on the following Monday. So we never got retained by these people.

Now, do we want to take a lot of discovery about what Goldman might have learned from a bunch of investment bankers

confidential information that did not actually result in the

assignment that has nothing to do with this case whatsoever?

during a potential engagement where they did not get

And what is the reason to do that? If we were to do that, it is under the most wacky legal theory as I have ever heard in my life. The theory is somehow, because we could have been potentially liable under the securities laws for selling Enron commercial paper -- now, it is Enron who is saying that.

Enron is not saying that they actually violated the Federal Securities Laws when they violated the commercial paper, which implicitly this would be saying, but they are saying that because Goldman could somehow be liable under the securities

laws, they might have gotten benefit by the fact that we paid

off the commercial paper. Well, there are two problems with

that from a logical point of view.

Number one, how do we figure that out? Do you conduct a securities law trial to see whether or not Goldman would have been liable under the securities laws to these various investors to figure out whether we got a benefit? This is clearly as a legal matter not what Congress had in mind when they enacted 547 and 550. The benefit they had in mind was not a potential speculative relief from a legal liability. Obviously a guarantor in the contract or if you sold receivables with recourse, you could look at that and you could say, "Okay. I can decide that question. It is a clear,

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legal finite obligation that has been relieved by the party getting the benefit." But the idea that somebody might have sued us under the securities laws, if this paper didn't get paid back, and that we would be concerned 30 years after Penn Central. To tell you the truth, we tried to find files about this crazy Penn Central case, which was one of their requests, and the answer to us was there was an old Sullivan & Cromwell partner who is retired, maybe he can find it somewhere. nobody else even knows where they are. The idea of 30 years later that we are worried about that and we did this transaction because of that, this is fantasy land. They are relying on a situation that occurred in 1974 in a different world, in a different market, in a different set of Federal Securities Laws than exist today. They don't have a scintilla of evidence that any such concern motivated Goldman Sachs at all. But we are not saying block the discovery. They deposed Mr. Wall.

JUDGE GONZALEZ: Let me just ask you this. I assume this <u>Penn Central</u> issue, at least in part, was raised by Enron, and they cite in their letter on page 3, in the third paragraph that starts on that page: Indeed, a policy manual produced by Goldman mentions the <u>Penn Central</u> default, the subsequent settlement between Goldman and the SEC, as well as the resulting affirmative obligations that were placed on Goldman to investigate the creditworthiness of an issuer of

commercial paper.

MR. MOLONEY: Right. That policy manual was dated 1996. No witness in this case has ever said they used it. It was inoperative at the time of the events in question here, and it was never updated. Their policy manual provides that the old commercial paper is going to be issued pursuant to this consent decree by an entity that no longer exists, Goldman Sachs Commercial Paper. It stopped existing five years before.

So the "policy manual" they are relying on they know is ridiculous and has no relevance whatsoever and it was not motivating what anybody was doing in 2001. In that policy manual, just for historical purposes, said basically there was a consent decree entered into in 1974 with the Securities & Exchange Commission as a result of the Penn Central bankruptcy, which I think occurred in late 1972 or so, and that as a result of that, there was a consent agreement that actually remained in place at Goldman until 1995, when it was dissolved by the SEC. But even 1995 is six years before the events at issue here, and that consent decree has really no relevance to this lawsuit whatsoever nor does this beneficiary theory that they are arguing have any resonance.

That is why I raised the issue about Deutsche Bank and UBS. If we are really going to take securities law type litigation discovery, "we knew more than they knew," to figure

out whether we got some benefit from Enron's paying them off by buying back their commercial paper, this case is going sideways. We are not going forward anymore. We are going backwards. We might as well say we just started the case from ground zero. Forget about the fact that we have now spent tens of millions of dollars in discovery and have gotten this far along.

Your Honor, I think it is more reasonable, frankly, if you want to have briefing on this beneficiary issue, we are happy to move for partial summary judgment. If they feel that they need the deposition of Ms. Huffman, who was the lawyer that negotiated the contract, that is scheduled May 9th and 10th, as soon as that is over, we will move for partial summary judgment and we can see. Your Honor can see briefing as to whether this theory has any legs whatsoever. If it doesn't, it will greatly simplify this case; if Your Honor agrees with them, then we can do all this extra crazy discovery.

JUDGE GONZALEZ: If I were to agree with them, it wouldn't be crazy discovery; right?

MR. MOLONEY: No. I concur, Your Honor; correct. We will do all this discovery. I am editorializing based on my own view. It is very ironic, Your Honor, because they consulted with my partner Lindsee Granfield at the time of these events in question. We were involved in drafting this

agency agreement, and they did it because they knew if they did this deal they would be sued and they didn't want to.

That is what the record is. They did not want to get involved in this transaction at all. They wanted the people to do it on their own. Enron couldn't in this mechanical manner clear the trades. So they said, "How can we be protected, so we are not going to get sued?" We said, "You can never figure out what a bankruptcy estate might do. We will enter into an agency agreement and therefore there will be no transfer. You will not be the beneficiary. There is no way that they argue that this was for your benefit." Fine. We did that. We have a written agreement that says that. It hasn't stopped this lawsuit so far, but to say that we somehow did this in order to avoid litigation is just ridiculous.

JUDGE GONZALEZ: In terms of the deposition, you have stated that you will give a date or you will work with Enron on a date and the parties for the deposition of Hurst?

MR. MOLONEY: If that is what they want, yes, Your Honor.

JUDGE GONZALEZ: All right. In terms of the documents, the primary argument is that the party who sought this conference really doesn't have standing to make the arguments they are making today anyway, and as far as you were concerned with Enron you had reached at least some understanding about the documents and you haven't heard to the

contrary until you saw the letter from Enron joining in the request for the conference?

MR. MOLONEY: The one thing I would add to that is our position is on the merits. What we have produced is all of the documents that would be relevant and we have agreed to produce all the witnesses who would be relevant without getting cast off to a sideshow that was going to prevent the orderly administration of this case.

JUDGE GONZALEZ: That raises then I guess the next issue that comes to my mind. As a practical matter is there any use in talking to Enron any more, because if your position is you have produced what is relevant for the case before me and everything else, in your view, as a matter of law is it irrelevant to the issues before me, whether it was announced or not you were really then at odds with Enron if Enron wants more?

MR. MOLONEY: I think that is a fair conclusion, Your Honor, based on where we sit right now. Assuming Mr. Schatzow doesn't charge his mind again, that is where we are.

JUDGE GONZALEZ: All right. Thank you.

MS. KOVSKY-APAP: Your Honor, may I respond to a few points that Mr. Moloney raised?

JUDGE GONZALEZ: All right. Go ahead.

MS. KOVSKY-APAP: First, I guess I would characterize it as procedural. With respect to Exhibit A to Goldman's

letter, the e-mail exchange between me and Mr. Moloney, I would like to clarify that the reason that the moving parties didn't bring this up is that we were concerned about the dressing down that Mr. Moloney's colleague, counsel for Lehman, had given to counsel for Enron for disclosing to the Court discussions that Lehman characterized as being in the course of settlement negotiations. That is the only reason that we did not bring it to the Court's attention.

Additionally, I would also like to point out that I had promptly responded to Mr. Moloney's e-mail indicating that the proposal was completely insufficient. Goldman Sachs is absolutely on notice that we were interested in all of the Project Truman documents, because I had that discussion with counsel for Goldman in several meet and confers.

Additionally, Veritas Software, which is one of the moving parties here, did, in fact, submit formal document requests similar to those that Enron had submitted. Veritas did this in the event that it was not enough for us to be able to rely on document requests submitted by other parties in this litigation. If one of the moving parties needed to formally make the request that had been made informally in the course of meet and confers, we were going to dot every "I" and cross every "T."

Regarding the substance of the issue, I am pleased that Mr. Moloney concedes that he is editorializing his own

copies.

view here. This is really the main issue. Mr. Moloney continually states that Project Truman is not relevant here, and that is really the only issue at stake here. We have demonstrated that the documents are relevant and that the witnesses are relevant. Mr. Moloney may wish to argue the merits of Goldman's agency defense here, but those arguments are misplaced. Mr. Moloney keeps telling us the "factual background of the matter," but this is Goldman Sachs' version of the facts, something that we are entitled to test for discovery.

JUDGE GONZALEZ: In essence or at least in part, you want to test the accuracy of the statement made by Mr. Fastow, assuming that it was not taken out of context, which I have no reason to believe that it was. If Mr. Fastow stated that no confidential information was provided during that particular meeting or period, you want an opportunity to test that by asking people at Goldman about what they may have received?

MS. KOVSKY-APAP: We believe that confidential information was provided. Perhaps, not at that initial meeting with Mr. Fastow, but, if I could approach, Your Honor, I would like to show you some pages from the deposition transcript of Greg Caudell, who is an employee of Enron.

JUDGE GONZALEZ: Is it in the papers that I have?

MS. KOVSKY-APAP: It is not, but I have brought

JUDGE GONZALEZ: All right.

MS. KOVSKY-APAP: (Handing.)

Your Honor, looking at pages 186 through 188 of the Caudell deposition transcript, it appears that Goldman Sachs was literally in the building at Enron in Houston sometime in the fall of 2001. According to Greg Caudell: There was a lot of stuff going on. Goldman Sachs was occupying a large conference room. People were feeding them documents. Some very high-level Enron executives were there, Tim DeSpain, Jeff McMahon. The doors in the conference room were specifically always kept closed. They closed the doors when they walked in and when they walked out.

Although Mr. Caudell was not able to speak directly to whether or not anything confidential was going on, it certainly sounds like it and we should be permitted to find out.

I would like to turn Your Honor's attention to one additional document from Mitch Taylor's desk file. This is a document produced by Enron. It wasn't in the papers that we submitted, but I brought copies.

JUDGE GONZALEZ: All right.

MS. KOVSKY-APAP: If I may approach?

JUDGE GONZALEZ: Go ahead.

MS. KOVSKY-APAP: (Handing.) These appear to be notes from Mitch Taylor, who was an employee of Enron. On

September 26th, I met with ASF, which I believe is Andy
Fastow, this morning and outlined my concern with showing
everything to GS. I believe "GS" means Goldman Sachs. He was
okay with it, and said we would not get meaningful answers
unless we shared everything.

I want to know what they shared. I believe we are entitled to know that.

JUDGE GONZALEZ: All right. Thank you.

MR. MOLONEY: Your Honor, if I could say something about these two documents?

JUDGE GONZALEZ: I will give you an opportunity.

Is there anyone else? Either Enron or --

MR. SCHATZOW: Judge, I guess I rise primarily to answer Mr. Moloney's question of "I never know when I have worked something out." Mr. Moloney will know when he has worked something out with me, when I tell him that we have worked it out. But when he makes a proposal, and I don't respond, when I tell him, as I told him during the Newgard deposition, that there are other people that I have to talk to; and, if I never get back to him and say "I accept your proposal," I haven't accepted it.

This exhibit, I was dumbfounded when this was the evidence of our agreement that they cite to in their letter. If you look at their Exhibit A, he is specifically asked by Ms. Kovsky-Apap: Yesterday Tom made a proposal regarding

Project Truman witnesses and documents. Could one of you please send us an e-mail with the details of that proposal so that we can discuss it without error or mischaracterization? Then Mr. Moloney replies shortly thereafter, and he says: We propose to do this. Our hope is that this will not be necessary in terms of documents I proposed making available. I also agreed that we would treat all other Project Truman docs as subject to a litigation freeze.

There is no indication in there that anybody, including me, agreed to anything. It is a proposal. He was asked what proposal he made, and he said what proposal he made. Now, prior to this document we specifically wrote to Goldman on January 10th and we told them that we were at an impasse with regard to these Project Truman documents. After this day, in March, we wrote to them, and while we didn't refer to Project Truman specifically, we said that we reserve the right to go to the Court with regard to all of the document requests that they had not been responsive to.

There is never a time when I have said to Mr. Moloney,
"We have got a deal. I agree to your proposal." We didn't,
because we knew that there were non-dealer Defendants who were
taking the lead on this issue. We don't think it is necessary
that we take the lead on every single discovery dispute, when
others have the same discovery dispute. It is not as though
we ever said to him, "Fine, Tom. This is it." So when he

says, "assuming Mr. Schatzow doesn't change his mind again,"
nobody, including me, ever communicated to Mr. Moloney that I
had made up my mind to accept his proposal, because I hadn't.
All he shows you in support of that is this Exhibit A, in
which he was asked what proposal was made and he said what
proposal was made, and he never said that anybody accepted his
proposal and he couldn't.

So to the extent that Mr. Moloney is confused about that, the answer is when a proposal is made to me, you will know that I accept it when I say I accept it. Not when I say I have got to talk to other people and I never have another conversation with him on that subject.

With regard to Penn Central I really don't understand how it is that Goldman is trying to make that a red herring in this case. The Penn Central case, Goldman's sale of Penn Central commercial paper to its investor clients was the subject of litigation, it was the subject of settlements, payments by Goldman Sachs, the subject of a consent order with the SEC. When Mr. Moloney keeps saying the "out of date manual," it makes me think of some of the depositions that we have been to where Mr. Moloney has said that the manual was out of date and Mr. Moloney has said that nobody pays attention to the manual. But this was a manual produced by Goldman Sachs. Enron didn't make this up. We didn't find it in the street. It was produced to us by Goldman Sachs in

response to our request for manuals that govern the operation of people who were involved in commercial paper trading. It gets produced. It has got a reference in it. It has got a date of July 1996. It is true that no Goldman Sachs witness has admitted yet to ever having seen that document, but we did not make up the document. It was produced by Goldman Sachs to us, and it makes specific reference to Penn Central. At the end of it, it tells you exactly why the Penn Central case is relevant. I am reading from the manual. This is Bates stamped, produced by Goldman Sachs, 0269 and it continues to 0270.

MS. MALLON: It is attached to our letter.

MR. SCHATZOW: It says the Penn Central bankruptcy affected the commercial paper market generally, and the Federal Reserve Board had to intervene to restore confidence in that market. The injunction contained an undertaking by GS & Co. to implement a statement of policy concerning its activities as a commercial paper broker or dealer. This is the key sentence, Judge. These policies imposed upon employees of GSMM LP and GS & Co. certain affirmative obligations to investigate the creditworthiness of an issuer of commercial paper.

Mr. Moloney can say and, perhaps, there will be witnesses at Goldman Sachs who will say the same thing, that they did not care about what happened in the Penn Central

case. That that was not a standard by which they were

trying -- they were concerned about their risk as a commercial

paper dealer who had put their clients into Enron commercial

paper. Maybe nobody cared about that, and if the witnesses

will say that, then the witnesses will say that. But we think

it is a pretty amazing and bold statement for someone to say,

"We didn't care about the fact that we had liability in the

Penn Central case. We didn't care about the fact that we had

to undergo a consent decree with the SEC, which changed the

way we operated. Once that consent decree vanished, we have

no more concerns. It doesn't matter. Nobody is going to ever

sue us. Nobody could sue us, because the Penn Central case is

30 years old." It doesn't sound logical to me, Judge. It

Our beneficiary theory, he thinks it is farfetched, and I have no doubt that his preference would be to file a motion for partial summary judgment before we have completed discovery. If I were him, I would like to do the same thing. I would like to have you resolve this on an incomplete record. That is what I would like, if I were Goldman Sachs. But that is a silly way to proceed in this case.

doesn't make any sense to me at all.

To say that there is no relevance to Project Truman documents, when the Project Truman documents that have already been produced, limited as they are -- as I understand it, documents during the week of October 22nd, and documents that

reference commercial paper, and documents that reference comments by Enron employees during that period of time -- to say that that can't have anything to do with the terms and circumstances under which the so-called agency agreement was entered into, when Mr. Hurst was down meeting with Mr. Lay the same weekend that the agreement was entered into, when we have Mr. Hickerson, who they know from the deposition of Mr. Newgard, was the Enron employee who was charged with the responsibility for these commercial paper prepayments, is on tape talking to a J.P. Morgan employee about Hurst meeting with Lay and its impact on commercial paper and how things are going to be done, it is not the way discovery works, Judge. It may turn out at the end of the day, Mr. Moloney -- I would be very surprised -- may be completely right about everything he said.

JUDGE GONZALEZ: You turned away from the microphone when you said that.

MR. SCHATZOW: Mr. Moloney may be completely right about everything he said, Judge. I doubt it, but he may be. But the point is it is discovery that will tell. It is not what Mr. Moloney says or what I say. It is what the witnesses say and what the documents say, and we are entitled to get at the documents and get at the witnesses so that we can know what they say, particularly when the minimal amount of documents produced so far indicate that there were

conversations about commercial paper, there were conversations about public information and private information as it applied to Enron commercial paper, and where we know from the testimony that Enron was in distress and wanted to prepay its commercial paper and it couldn't do it without its dealers.

All we are saying is we want to be able to look at it, and we think that we are entitled to look at it. We think you are right, Judge. We are at the point now, at least in terms of Enron, I don't really think that there is anything to talk about in terms of further meet and confers and compromise. Their position is we are not entitled to it. We put a date on our request of August of 2001 for the end of the Project Truman materials. We think it is reasonable and we think for all of the reasons that have been articulated thus far, we ought to be able to get at that.

JUDGE GONZALEZ: All right. Thank you.

Mr. Moloney?

MR. MOLONEY: Yes, Your Honor. I think where we are is that Your Honor is going to have to decide whether what we have agreed to do so far is sufficient or whether we are required to do somebody else.

The document which you saw which was the transcript of Mr. Caudell and the closed door meetings that he is referring to that took place in Houston on pages 186 and 187, if you look at page 187, he says: I think at this point Andrew

Fastow was gone. I am looking at page 187, lines 2 to 4. It says, Jeff McMahon was probably involved in these conversations. We can date this. Andrew Fastow -- it is a matter of record, and I am sure they will confirm this -- that Mr. Fastow was gone on October 24th, so Enron announces his public resignation. This is exactly the discussion that I had with Mr. Schatzow. He said the same thing to me. He said, "Look, in that last week of October Goldman was down there and they were having discussions with Enron." So I said, "Okay. I will produce all communications that the Project Truman team has with Enron during that last week, and I will let you depose Mr. Gieselman, who was the person who was there. If after you finish Mr. Gieselman's deposition you feel you need to depose the Vice Chairman of Goldman Sachs, Mr. Hurst, I will let you depose him too."

So it is not a question that we are stonewalling him.

We didn't say, "Okay. Just accept our view of the facts."

Based on what they say, there is discovery they want to find out. We have produced the documents already. Exhibit E, which they attached to their letter, are some of the Project Truman documents. We have given a date for Mr. Gieselman. It is scheduled for May 20th-something of May 21st or 22nd or something like that. So it is happening in the next month or so.

So we are not stonewalling them when it comes to this

discovery. Now, the question is: why should they get anything more? Why should they be able to go back to Goldman's Sachs' relationship at the outset of Project Truman and start deposing lots of analysts who may have been talking about -- perhaps, it started, just as a history lesson, it involved a call from Hurst to Kenneth Lay, which they will find out about or which they already know about, because it is in the newspapers -- where he said I think Enron is vulnerable to a takeover, and so Goldman was giving advice on an anti-takeover strategy and poison pills and things like that. They had no idea that this company, which was the seventh largest company in the United States, was about to go through the hellish nightmare that resulted in them ending up in this court and this case going on like this.

They will depose Gieselman and Hurst. If, based on those depositions, they think that they need more discovery, we will either give it to them or, if necessary, we will come back to this Court. We have not been here every day. I haven't been here since I joined the case in September. After that one group with that one dispute, I haven't been back here for a discovery dispute since. So I am not going to fool around with discovery. I would like to get this case over. As he said, I would like to move for summary judgment relatively soon. I understand there are certain witnesses they have to take, but on the agency agreement -- Your Honor,

if you look at Exhibit G to our letter, which is the agency agreement -- this is dated October 28th, which is the day before any of the trades settled on the 29th that are at issue through November 2nd, and it is basically saying that we are going to have a ministerial job and that they are going to front us the payments and we are going to make the payments on their behalf. Now, why do they need to take lots of discovery regarding the circumstances of this? They signed it. Their witnesses acknowledged they signed it. Why do we need to go off into this frolic and detour to figure out what the meaning of this letter is?

Now, if it is their beneficiary theory, I am saying as a matter of law that theory has no legs. Because if you look at 550, a speculative benefit will never satisfy 550; and the fact that we may have eliminated some securities law liability is at best expecting a benefit. So I am saying, as a matter of law, that discovery is never going to be appropriate versus spending lots of time and money going after discovery that as a matter of law is irrelevant is what I think is inappropriate.

We are happy to brief that question, and I think the most appropriate forum to brief that question would be in a motion for summary judgment. I will brief it in another forum, if that is more helpful to the Court.

We think we have given them the discovery that they

legitimately need, and we think they have shown no basis whatsoever for getting more discovery than what we have asked for. The theory that they are espousing as a basis for alternative discovery is not only flawed as a matter of law, but will take us off in a crazy direction in this case. Because if that discovery is relevant, we are suddenly litigating a securities lawsuit where we are entitled to discovery going the other way. We are entitled to discovery from Enron. All of these relationships with all these other parties who we sold these securities to, we are entitled to discovery from all of those parties as to what they might independently know about Enron. Instead of there being 150 depositions, we will have 600 depositions in this case. That can't be good for a bankruptcy case. It just doesn't make any sense.

JUDGE GONZALEZ: All right. Thank you.

We will leave today with the following. Work through the schedule as the parties have said they will with respect to Mr. Hurst. I think I will rule on what is before me today on Tuesday, which I believe is April 24th at 2:00 p.m. No party has to appear in person. Just set up the conference call coming in and it will be on the record. If someone cares to appear, they are more than welcome to appear at 2:00 on Tuesday. I will leave it up to Enron to communicate to everyone if there is a change in that schedule.

	Proceedings
1	MR. SCHATZOW: Very well, Your Honor.
2	JUDGE GONZALEZ: All right. Thank you.
3	MR. PELL: Thank you, Judge.
4	MS. KOVSKY-APAP: Thank you, Your Honor.
5	JUDGE GONZALEZ: We are going to take a five-minute
6	recess. There is another matter scheduled for 3:00. I will
7	be out in a few minutes for that.
8	(Whereupon, from 3:07 p.m. to 3:17 p.m. a recess was
9	taken.)
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I	l 42
1	CERTIFICATE
2	STATE OF NEW YORK)
3	: SS: COUNTY OF NEW YORK)
4	
5	I, DEBORAH HUNTSMAN, a Shorthand Reporter and
6	Notary Public within and for the State of New York, do hereby
7	certify:
8	That the within is a true and accurate
9	transcript from the official electronic sound recording of the
10	proceedings held on the 19th day of April, 2007.
11	I further certify that I am not related by blood
12	or marriage to any of the parties and that I am not interested
13	in the outcome of this matter.
14	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand
15	this 24th day of April, 2007.
16	
17	
18	DEBORAH HUNTSMAN
19	DEBORAH HUNTSMAN
20	PROOFREAD BY HALLIE CANTOR
21	ROUGH DRAFT SENT ON 4/20/2007 AT APPROXIMATELY 9:00 A.M. PRELIMINARY TRANSCRIPT SENT ON 4/20/2007
22	
23	
24	

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
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Redacted

CONFIRM FOR #148620 CABBI A

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       65386
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  CLR Broker: 0000
  B/D INT ACCT AGT INT ACCT AGT ID ROLE MKT ACCT TYPE SIDE SEC TYPE 671-12602-7 4945317 10419 P PRN CASH SL 3
  CUSIP/Desc: 29356AYF7 Trade Date: 10/26/2001 Settlement Date: 10/30/2001 PENRON CORP. *3**DIS**D092401M111501BE+$
 Status: R Date Confirm Received: 10/31/2001
Cancel: N Affirmation Date :
                       103000275412
Conf # :
                    2.80000000 Currency : USD
                     3,000,000.0000
 Onty :
Price :
                           0.00000000 Int Pty 1: 71080 Acct:
 Net Price:
                       3,000,000.00
 Princ :
                                 0.00 Instr
                             3,733.33 Instr
 SEC Fees :
                                                  2:
 Interest :
                                  0.00 Int Pty 2: 00000
                                                                Acct:
 Taxes :
                                  0.00
 Comm
                                  0.00 Instr
 Other
                        2,996,266.67 Instr 2:
071863561 148620 CABEI A
 Net Amt :
Control :
                                            209 S LASALLE ST STE 107
   C/O BRINSON PARTNERS
   ATTN FIXED INCOME OPERATIONS
```

1

CONFIRM FOR #148520-BANCO GUATEMALA

Control: 071863562 Eligible: N Time Frame: SAME DAY

65386 06647

From: CLR Broker: 0000

B/D INT ACCT AGT INT ACCT AGT ID ROLE MKT ACCT TYPE SIDE SEC TYPE 671-12604-3 4945317 10419 P PRN CASH SL 3

CUSIP/Desc: 29356AYF7 Trade Date: 10/26/2001 Settlement Date: 10/30/2001 PENRON CORP. *3**DIS**D092401M111501BE+\$

Date Confirm Received: 10/31/2001 Affirmation Date : Status: R

Cancel: N

Conf # : 103000275512 Onc. Price : Net Price: Princ : 0.00 Instr Instr 1: Instr 2: 18,666.67 0.00 Int Pty 2: 00000 Acct: Interest : Taxes 0.00 Comm 0.00 Instr 1: Other 14,981,333.33 Instr 2 . Net Amt : 071863562 148520 BANCO GUATEMALA Control :

C/O BRINSON PARTNERS #148520

209 S. LASALLE ST. STE 107

ATTN FIXED INCOME OPERATIONS

Shelley J. Aron Associate Director UBS Global Asset Management Phone 312-525-7255 Fax 312-525-7060

UBS Tower One North Wacker Drive Chicago, IL 60606



VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF FEDERICA COLOMBI CONDUCTED ON MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 2006

INSTITUTE STATES BANGEUPTCY COURTS 1 1 1 2 3 4 4 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6		SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK In Re Enron : Chapter 11 ENRON CORP., et al., : Case No. 01-16034 (AJG) Reorganized Debtors : Jointly Administered ENRON CORP., : Plaintiff, : V. : Adv. No. 03-92677 (AJG) J.P. MORGAN SECURITIES :	2 3 4	ON BEHALF OF ENRON CORP.:
To Be Brivon		In Re Enron : Chapter 11 ENRON CORP., et al., : Case No. 01-16034 (AJG) Reorganized Debtors. : Jointly Administered	2 3 4	ON BEHALF OF ENRON CORP.:
Page 2 Page 2 1 (Caption continued from previous page) 2		Defendants :X (Caption continued on page two) Videotaped Deposition of FEDERICA COLOMBI New York, New York September 18, 2006 9:49 a.m. Job No.: 1-86305 Pages 1 through 207	7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	VENABLE LLP 575 7th Street, Northwest Washington, D.C. 20004 (202) 344-4000 -and- BRIAN MADDOX, ESQUIRE VENABLE LLP 405 Lexington Avenue, 56th Floor New York, New York 10174 (212) 307-5500 ON BEHALF OF CITIBANK, N.A.; CITI INSTITUTIONAL CORPORATE & MORTGAGE BOND FUND; AND BANCO NACIONAL DE MEXICO: AMANDA L. WOLFE, ESQUIRE PAUL WEISS RIFKIND WHARTON & GARRISON LLP 1285 Avenue of the Americas New York, New York 10019
Page 2 1 (Caption continued from previous page) 2			24	(2.2) 3.3 3000
1 (Caption continued from previous page) 2			25	
2 3 ENRON CORP., : 3 ON BEHALF OF DELL COMPUTER PRODUCTS: 4 Plaintiff, : 4 SABRINA L. STREUSAND, ESQUIRE 5 v. : 5 HUGHES & LUCE LLP 6 MASS MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE : Adv. No. 03-92682(AJG) 6 111 Congress Avenue, Suite 900			_	Page 4
3 ENRON CORP., : 3 ON BEHALF OF DELL COMPUTER PRODUCTS: 4 Plaintiff, : 4 SABRINA L. STREUSAND, ESQUIRE 5 v. : 5 HUGHES & LUCE LLP 6 MASS MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE : Adv. No. 03-92682(AJG) 6 111 Congress Avenue, Suite 900				APPEARANCES CONTINUED
4 Plaintiff, : 4 SABRINA L. STREUSAND, ESQUIRE 5 v. : 5 HUGHES & LUCE LLP 6 MASS MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE : Adv. No. 03-92682(AJG) 6 111 Congress Avenue, Suite 900				ON BEHALF OF DELL COMPUTER PRODUCTS:
5 v. : 5 HUGHES & LUCE LLP 6 MASS MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE : Adv. No. 03-92682(AJG) 6 111 Congress Avenue, Suite 900				
6 MASS MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE : Adv. No. 03-92682(AJG) 6 111 Congress Avenue, Suite 900		•		_
I J Austin Texas (X/III	7		7	Austin, Texas 78701
8 Defendants. : 8 (512) 482-6800				
9x 9 (Present via Telephone)				
10 (Hesent via Telephone)				(17050iii viii 1010piioiio)
Deposition of FEDERICA COLOMBI, held at the				
7		,		ON BEHALF OF GOLDMAN, SACHS & CO. AND LEHMAI
12 ON BEHALF OF GOLDMAN, SACHS & CO. AND LE 13 COMMERCIAL PAPER, INC.:				
14 FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI LLP 14 MICHELE KENNEY, ESQUIRE				•
15 666 Fifth Avenue 15 MICHAEL ROSENSAFT, ESQUIRE				
16 New York, New York 10103-3198 16 BOAZ A. WEINSTEIN, ESQUIRE				
17 (212) 318-3000 17 CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON				
		` '		
18 One Liberty Plaza 19 New York, New York 10006				•
20 19 New York, New York 10006 20 (212) 225-2000				
20 (212) 225-2000 21 Pursuant to agreement, before Patricia Mulligan 21				(212) 223-2000
21 Pursuant to agreement, before Patricia Mulligan 21 22 Carruthers, Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary 22		-		
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24 the State of New York. 24 25 25	23			

1 (Pages 1 to 4)

VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF FEDERICA COLOMBI CONDUCTED ON MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 2006

	Page 65		Page 67
1	F. COLOMBI	1	F. COLOMBI
12:08:00 2	Q And what's noted here as a trade date of	12:12:14 2	Q I would like for you to take a look at the
12:08:04 3	October 12, 2001, is the same. Correct?	12:12:18 3	first page of Exhibit 10,012, which is has a stamp
12:08:08 4	A Yes.	12:12:24 4	of Kelly 000060 in the bottom right-hand corner.
12:08:08 5	MR. MURPHY: Object to the form of the	12:12:31 5	Do you see that document?
12:08:09 6	question. The same as what?	12:12:32 6	A Yes.
12:08:11 7	Q The same as on the preceding page. Correct?	12:12:35 7	Q Now, actually, I would like for you to
12:08:14 8	A Yes.	12:12:37 8	compare that document with the Goldman confirm that
12:08:15 9	Q Now, the discount price on the confirmation	12:12:41 9	you just had, maybe two exhibits ago. What was that
12:08:2310	is 2.8000 percent. Do you see that?	12:12:4710	exhibit number?
12:08:2711	A Yes.	12:12:5011	A Exhibit 10,010.
12:08:2912	Q And on the preceding page the rate is noted	12:12:5312	Q Okay. Now, the Exhibit 10,012 is dated
12:08:3313	at 2.81 percent. Do you see that?	12:13:0213	October 29th, 2001. Do you see that?
12:08:3614	A Yes.	12:13:0614	A Yes.
12:08:3615	Q Can you explain that difference?	12:13:0715	Q And it refers to commercial paper with a
12:08:4016	A Probably the calculation in the sell.	12:13:0713	maturity date of December 12th of 2001. Right?
12:08:4717	Q So, despite that difference in rate between	12:13:1317	A Yes.
12:08:5318	what's on Page 105 and 106, you still believe that the	12:13:1818	Q And so this corresponds to the commercial
12:08:5919	confirmation and the investment voucher are describing	12:13:2319	paper that you bought from Goldman on October the 10th
12:09:0720	the same transaction?	12:13:2720	of 2001. Right?
12:09:0821	A Yes.	12:13:2921	MR. MURPHY: Object to the form of the
12:09:0822	Q And would these funds have come from the Bank		question. Misquotes the witness.
12:09:1123	One account that you described earlier to go to Lehman		A Yes.
12:09:1424	for this commercial paper purchase?	12:13:3424	Q Now, you see there a reference to 273 to the
12:09:1725	A Yes.	12:13:5125	right of the maturity date. Do you see that?
12.03.17.23	Page 66		Page 68
1	F. COLOMBI	1	F. COLOMBI
12:09:17 2	Q And would you have expected, based on your	12:13:54 2	A Yes.
12:09:21 3	prior arrangements with Lehman at maturity, for the	12:13:54 3	Q Is it your understanding that that was the
12:09:25 4	funds at maturity to go back into that same Bank One	12:14:01 4	interest rate on the commercial paper when you
12:09:29 5	account?	12:14:07 5	MR. WILKINS: Well, strike that.
12:09:30 6	MR. WEINSTEIN: Object to the form.	12:14:11 6	Q The At the top of this document it says
12:09:32 7	A Yes.	12:14:18 7	"notification of secondary purchase."
12:09:40 8	Q Now, there's a fax indication of a fax in the	12:14:21 8	Do you see that?
12:09:46 9	top of Page 106. There's a date and a time and a fax	12:14:21 9	A Yes.
12:09:5110	number. Does that fax number look familiar to you?	12:14:2210	Q What does that mean to you?
12:09:5811	A No.	12:14:2311	A I don't know.
12:09:5912	Q It's a (312) number. Is that a Chicago	12:14:2512	
12:10:0713	number, to the best of your knowledge?	12:14:2813	of this that you were that Goldman was purchasing
12:10:0914	A To the best of my knowledge, but I'm not	12:14:3514	the Enron commercial paper from Kelly Properties?
12:10:1115	sure.	12:14:4115	
1		12:14:4316	5
12:10:1116	Wark Frommer, where was he based?		A Call you repeat the difestion?
12:10:1116	Q Mark Frommer, where was he based? A I think in Chicago.	12:14:4417	
	A I think in Chicago.	12:14:4417	Q Was it your understanding on October 29th,
12:10:1617	A I think in Chicago. Q Where was Kim Schaffer of Goldman based?	12:14:4417 12:14:4618	Q Was it your understanding on October 29th, 2001, that Goldman, Sachs was purchasing the Enron
12:10:1617 12:10:1818	A I think in Chicago.Q Where was Kim Schaffer of Goldman based?A I don't remember.	12:14:4417 12:14:4618 12:14:5119	Q Was it your understanding on October 29th, 2001, that Goldman, Sachs was purchasing the Enron commercial paper from Kelly Properties?
12:10:1617 12:10:1818 12:10:2519 12:10:4120	 A I think in Chicago. Q Where was Kim Schaffer of Goldman based? A I don't remember. MR. WILKINS: I would like to have marked as 	12:14:4417 12:14:4618 12:14:5119 12:14:5420	Q Was it your understanding on October 29th, 2001, that Goldman, Sachs was purchasing the Enron commercial paper from Kelly Properties? MR. ROSENSAFT: Same objection.
12:10:1617 12:10:1818 12:10:2519	A I think in Chicago. Q Where was Kim Schaffer of Goldman based? A I don't remember. MR. WILKINS: I would like to have marked as the next exhibit, it's Kelly 60 and 61, which is I	12:14:4417 12:14:4618 12:14:5119 12:14:5420 12:14:5521	Q Was it your understanding on October 29th, 2001, that Goldman, Sachs was purchasing the Enron commercial paper from Kelly Properties? MR. ROSENSAFT: Same objection. A From Kelly Properties. Yes.
12:10:1617 12:10:1818 12:10:2519 12:10:4120 12:10:4421	A I think in Chicago. Q Where was Kim Schaffer of Goldman based? A I don't remember. MR. WILKINS: I would like to have marked as the next exhibit, it's Kelly 60 and 61, which is I think Number 14 down on your chart towards the bottom	12:14:4417 12:14:4618 12:14:5119 12:14:5420 12:14:5521	Q Was it your understanding on October 29th, 2001, that Goldman, Sachs was purchasing the Enron commercial paper from Kelly Properties? MR. ROSENSAFT: Same objection. A From Kelly Properties. Yes. Q The confirm in the top right says "We bought
12:10:1617 12:10:1818 12:10:2519 12:10:4120 12:10:4421 12:10:4922	A I think in Chicago. Q Where was Kim Schaffer of Goldman based? A I don't remember. MR. WILKINS: I would like to have marked as the next exhibit, it's Kelly 60 and 61, which is I think Number 14 down on your chart towards the bottom of the first page.	12:14:4417 12:14:4618 12:14:5119 12:14:5420 12:14:5521 12:15:0022	Q Was it your understanding on October 29th, 2001, that Goldman, Sachs was purchasing the Enron commercial paper from Kelly Properties? MR. ROSENSAFT: Same objection. A From Kelly Properties. Yes. Q The confirm in the top right says "We bought the following commercial paper."
12:10:1617 12:10:1818 12:10:2519 12:10:4120 12:10:4421 12:10:4922 12:10:5423	A I think in Chicago. Q Where was Kim Schaffer of Goldman based? A I don't remember. MR. WILKINS: I would like to have marked as the next exhibit, it's Kelly 60 and 61, which is I think Number 14 down on your chart towards the bottom	12:14:4417 12:14:4618 12:14:5119 12:14:5420 12:14:5521 12:15:0022 12:15:0523	Q Was it your understanding on October 29th, 2001, that Goldman, Sachs was purchasing the Enron commercial paper from Kelly Properties? MR. ROSENSAFT: Same objection. A From Kelly Properties. Yes. Q The confirm in the top right says "We bought the following commercial paper." Do you see that?

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	Page 69		Page 71
1	F. COLOMBI	1	F. COLOMBI
12:15:08 2	Q Is that consistent with your understanding of	12:18:04 2	fax, E mail, regular US mail?
12:15:13 3	the terms of the transaction?	12:18:07 3	A I don't know.
12:15:15 4	A Yes.	12:18:09 4	Q Well, tell me what this document is.
12:15:15 5	Q Now, in the bottom right you see the phrase	12:18:17 5	A The funds transferred advice.
12:15:28 6	written "Goldman, Sachs & Co. acted as agent for Enror		Q And when What purpose does this document
12:15:33 7	Corp."	12:18:27 7	serve?
12:15:34 8	Do you see that?	12:18:28 8	MR. MURPHY: Object to the form of the
12:15:35 9	A Yes.	12:18:29 9	question.
12:15:3510	Q Did you have any conversations with anyone	12:18:3110	A I don't know. I can assume it's to tell us
12:15:3811	from Goldman, Sachs about acting as an agent for Enror	12:18:3411	of a funds transfer.
12:15:4312	Corp.?	12:18:3612	Q Okay. Well, let me just ask a different
12:15:4313	A Not that I recall.	12:18:4113	question.
12:15:4714	Q Did you see a copy of any agreement between	12:18:4514	What was your use for a document like this?
12:15:5415	Goldman, Sachs and Enron referring to an agency?	12:18:5015	A I don't remember. I don't remember seeing it
12:15:5916	A No.	12:18:5216	then, so
12:16:0117	Q To your knowledge did anyone else at Kelly	12:18:5317	Q I'm sorry?
12:16:0518	Properties speak to anyone from Goldman, Sachs about	12:18:5418	A I don't remember seeing it then, so I don't
12:16:0819	Goldman, Sachs serving as an agent for Enron Corp.?	12:18:5719	remember what we used this for.
12:16:1220	A Not to my knowledge. No.	12:18:5820	Q Okay. I thought you just testified that you
12:16:1621	Q Now, the rate on this confirm that's Exhibit	12:19:0121	would have seen this on or around October 29th.
12:16:2722	10,012 appears to say 273. Do you see that?	12:19:0422	A No. No. I said I don't remember when I saw
12:16:3223	A I see the 273. I didn't know that was the	12:19:0623	it. I've seen it before, but I don't know when it
12:16:3624	rate.	12:19:0924	was.
12:16:3625	Q Well, on your investment I'm sorry. On	12:19:0925	Q And the information on here about today,
	Page 70		Page 72
1	F. COLOMBI	1	F. COLOMBI
12:16:40 2	the confirm at the time that you bought this	12:19:21 2	October 29, 2001, we have charged your account, and i
12:16:43 3	commercial paper from Goldman, the rate was 278.	12:19:25 3	gives an account number as indicated, does that
12:16:48 4	Correct?	12:19:29 4	account number mean anything to you?
12:16:59 5	MR. MURPHY: Would you like her to look at an	12:19:32 5	A No.
12:17:01 6	exhibit, Mr. Wilkins?	12:19:36 6	Q And it says "Transferred the funds from our
12:17:03 7	Q If you would look at Exhibit 10,010, is that	12:19:39 7	account at Chase Manhattan Bank to" and then
12:17:07 8	correct?	12:19:42 8	there's some information there. Does that represent
12:17:07 9	A Yes.	12:19:45 9	the Bank One account that you testified about
12:17:0710	Q So that when you bought it from Goldman the	12:19:4910	previously?
12:17:1011	rate was 278. Right?	12:19:4911	A I believe so.
12:17:1212	A Yes.	12:20:1712	Q The next document I would like you to take a
12:17:1313	Q And when you sold it back to Goldman was it	12:20:1913	look at is I guess it would be the next-to-the-last
	sold back at 278 or 273?	12:20:2514	one on the first page, Kelly 102.
12:17:1614			
12:17:2115	A I don't recall.	12:20:3115	MR. MADDOX: It should be the 16th one down.
12:17:2115 12:17:2216	A I don't recall.Q Look at the second page. Have you seen this	12:20:3115 12:21:0416	MR. MADDOX: It should be the 16th one down. (Whereupon, Exhibit 10,013 is marked for
12:17:2115 12:17:2216 12:17:4417	A I don't recall. Q Look at the second page. Have you seen this document before?	12:20:3115 12:21:0416 12:21:2517	MR. MADDOX: It should be the 16th one down. (Whereupon, Exhibit 10,013 is marked for identification by the reporter.)
12:17:2115 12:17:2216 12:17:4417 12:17:4418	A I don't recall. Q Look at the second page. Have you seen this document before? A Yes.	12:20:3115 12:21:0416 12:21:2517 12:21:2518	MR. MADDOX: It should be the 16th one down. (Whereupon, Exhibit 10,013 is marked for identification by the reporter.) Q You have in front of you Exhibit 10,013. Do
12:17:2115 12:17:2216 12:17:4417 12:17:4418 12:17:4419	 A I don't recall. Q Look at the second page. Have you seen this document before? A Yes. Q The document is dated October 29, 2001. 	12:20:3115 12:21:0416 12:21:2517 12:21:2518 12:21:2919	MR. MADDOX: It should be the 16th one down. (Whereupon, Exhibit 10,013 is marked for identification by the reporter.) Q You have in front of you Exhibit 10,013. Do you recognize this document, Miss Colombi?
12:17:2115 12:17:2216 12:17:4417 12:17:4418 12:17:4419 12:17:5020	 A I don't recall. Q Look at the second page. Have you seen this document before? A Yes. Q The document is dated October 29, 2001. Correct? 	12:20:3115 12:21:0416 12:21:2517 12:21:2518 12:21:2919 12:21:3220	MR. MADDOX: It should be the 16th one down. (Whereupon, Exhibit 10,013 is marked for identification by the reporter.) Q You have in front of you Exhibit 10,013. Do you recognize this document, Miss Colombi? A Yes.
12:17:2115 12:17:2216 12:17:4417 12:17:4418 12:17:4419 12:17:5020 12:17:5121	 A I don't recall. Q Look at the second page. Have you seen this document before? A Yes. Q The document is dated October 29, 2001. Correct? A Yes. 	12:20:3115 12:21:0416 12:21:2517 12:21:2518 12:21:2919 12:21:3220 12:21:3221	MR. MADDOX: It should be the 16th one down. (Whereupon, Exhibit 10,013 is marked for identification by the reporter.) Q You have in front of you Exhibit 10,013. Do you recognize this document, Miss Colombi? A Yes. Q What is it?
12:17:2115 12:17:2216 12:17:4417 12:17:4418 12:17:4419 12:17:5020 12:17:5121 12:17:5122	 A I don't recall. Q Look at the second page. Have you seen this document before? A Yes. Q The document is dated October 29, 2001.	12:20:3115 12:21:0416 12:21:2517 12:21:2518 12:21:2919 12:21:3220 12:21:3221 12:21:3422	MR. MADDOX: It should be the 16th one down. (Whereupon, Exhibit 10,013 is marked for identification by the reporter.) Q You have in front of you Exhibit 10,013. Do you recognize this document, Miss Colombi? A Yes. Q What is it? A It's a printout from our the statement for
12:17:2115 12:17:2216 12:17:4417 12:17:4418 12:17:5020 12:17:5121 12:17:5122 12:17:5723	A I don't recall. Q Look at the second page. Have you seen this document before? A Yes. Q The document is dated October 29, 2001. Correct? A Yes. Q Would you have seen it on or around October 29, 2001?	12:20:3115 12:21:0416 12:21:2517 12:21:2518 12:21:2919 12:21:3220 12:21:3221 12:21:3422 12:21:3923	MR. MADDOX: It should be the 16th one down. (Whereupon, Exhibit 10,013 is marked for identification by the reporter.) Q You have in front of you Exhibit 10,013. Do you recognize this document, Miss Colombi? A Yes. Q What is it? A It's a printout from our the statement for a bank account that we balance daily.
12:17:2115 12:17:2216 12:17:4417 12:17:4418 12:17:4419 12:17:5020 12:17:5121 12:17:5122	 A I don't recall. Q Look at the second page. Have you seen this document before? A Yes. Q The document is dated October 29, 2001.	12:20:3115 12:21:0416 12:21:2517 12:21:2518 12:21:2919 12:21:3220 12:21:3221 12:21:3422 12:21:3923 12:21:4224	MR. MADDOX: It should be the 16th one down. (Whereupon, Exhibit 10,013 is marked for identification by the reporter.) Q You have in front of you Exhibit 10,013. Do you recognize this document, Miss Colombi? A Yes. Q What is it? A It's a printout from our the statement for

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	Page 125		Page 127
1	F. COLOMBI	1	F. COLOMBI
14:55:31 2	A Probably because Sandi was at a meeting.	14:58:26 2	from Kelly Properties or Kelly Services about
14:55:35 3	Q Why didn't you wait until she was out of the	14:58:30 3	preferential treatment between October 26 of 2001 and
14:55:38 4	meeting?	14:58:35 4	when you sent this E mail on January 16, 2002?
14:55:39 5	A I don't know. It was just a judgement call	14:58:40 5	A I don't remember.
14:55:43 6	that day, I guess.	14:58:42 6	Q Is it possible that you had?
14:55:44 7	Q Was it your practice to send her E mails	14:58:45 7	MR. MURPHY: Objection to the form of the
14:55:50 8	about conversations that you had with your dealers at	14:58:46 8	question.
14:55:57 9	Goldman and Lehman?	14:58:47 9	A I don't remember.
14:55:5810	A I would send her E mails about anything that	14:58:5610	Q If you had such conversations, who would have
14:56:0111	I needed her to know about if I couldn't find her that	14:59:0111	been the most likely person for you to have spoken to
14:56:0412	day if she was in meetings.	14:59:0412	about it?
14:56:0513	Q The Why did you copy Greg Radke?	14:59:0413	MR. MURPHY: Objection. Calls for
14:56:1014	A Because he's the manager.	14:59:0814	speculation.
14:56:1615	Q Well, after This is now over two months	14:59:1015	A The people in treasury.
14:56:3016	after you had sold back or redeemed the Enron	14:59:1316	Q When you say "the people in treasury," who
14:56:3617	commercial paper. So, why did you believe Greg Radke		are you referring to?
14:56:4018	was still interested in this information two months	14:59:1618	A Sandi, Greg, and Chanel.
14:56:4319	later?	14:59:2919	MR. WILKINS: Can we take a break at this
14:56:4320	MR. MURPHY: Object to the form of the	14:59:3020	time?
14:56:4421	question. No foundation.	14:59:3221	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Going off the record. The
14:56:4722	A Because he's my boss as well, so I usually	14:59:3322	time is 2:59 p.m.
14:56:5023	let them both know on any issue that I have.	14:59:3623	(Whereupon, a recess is taken.)
14:56:5524	Q So, every time you wrote an E mail to Sandi	15:08:0424	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Back on the record. The
14:57:0025	Galac you also copied Greg Radke?	15:09:3225	time is 3:09 p.m.
			-
_	Page 126		Page 128
1	F. COLOMBI	1	F. COLOMBI
14:57:02 2	MR. MURPHY: Objection. I don't think that's	15:09:38 2	Q Miss Colombi, on October Friday, October
14:57:03 3	a question.	15:09:43 3	26, 2001, in your conversations with Mark Frommer of
14:57:07 4	Q There's a question mark at the end.	15:09:50 4	Lehman did you discuss at all the issue of whether or
14:57:09 5	MR. MURPHY: Object to the form of the	15:09:56 5	not Lehman was acting as an agent for Enron Corp.? A No.
14:57:10 6	question.	15:10:01 6	
14:57:12 7	A I guess it would depend on what the issue	15:10:01 7 15:10:07 8	Q In your conversation with Kim Schaffer on October 26, 2001, did you discuss the issue at all of
14:57:15 8	was. There wasn't a regular practice to copy both of them or to send it just to one.		· · · · •
14:57:18 9	3	15:10:12 9 15:10:1610	whether Goldman was acting as an agent for Enron
14:57:2010 14:57:2311	Q Well, why did you send this one to both?MR. MURPHY: Objection. Asked and answered.		Corp.?
	A I don't know. I guess I felt they should	15:10:1611	A No.
14:57:2512 14:57:3013	both know.	15:10:2512	MR. WILKINS: I'm not sure if you've marked these already. I believe that they were handed to the
14:57:3013		15:10:2713	•
14:57:3214	Q Did you consider this to be important information at the time?	15:10:3214	court reporter prior to the lunch break. It's Kelly 00001 through
14:57:3515	A Yes.	15:10:4015	MR. MADDOX: I don't know if she did get a
		15:10:4516	· ·
14:57:3717	Q Why? A Because I was It was about the investments		copy of it. I know everybody else did, but I don't know if we actually gave a copy to the court reporter.
14:57:4418 14:57:4819	A Because I was It was about the investments that we did.	15:10:4918 15:11:1219	(Whereupon, Exhibit 10,019 is marked for
14:57:4819	Q Now, did you have any conversations with	15:11:1219	identification by the reporter.)
14:57:5420	anyone else within Kelly Property or Kelly Services	15:12:0820	
14:58:0721	about preferential treatment after sending this		Q You have in front of you Exhibit 10,019.
	E mail?	15:12:1322	Have you seen this exhibit before today? A Yes.
14:58:2023	A Not that I remember.	15:12:1823	
14:58:2124 14:58:2225	Q Did you have any conversations with anyone	15:12:1924 15:12:2925	Q When did you see it? A I don't remember. I might have seen it when
	CONVERSATIONS WITH ANYONE	ID:IZ:Z9Z5	A Tuon Fremember. I might have seen it when I

32 (Pages 125 to 128)



	Page 1		Page 3
	INITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT	1	APPEARANCES: (Cont'd)
-	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	2	` ,
	In Re Enron	3	CLEARY, GOTTLIEB, STEEN & HAMILTON, LLP
· ·	ENRON CORP., et al.,	4	Attorneys for Goldman Sachs & Company, Inc.
	Reorganized Debtors. Chapter 11 Case No: 01-16034 (AJG)	5	One Liberty Plaza
I	NRON CORP., Plaintiff,	6	New York, New York 10006-1470
	-against- -against- J.P. MORGAN SECURITIES, INC, et al.,	7	BY: AVRAM E. LUFT, ESQ.
	Defendants, adv No.: 03-92677 (AJG)	8	PHONE 212-225-2432
-	ENRON CORP.,	9	FAX 212-225-3999
	Plaintiff, -against-	10	E-MAIL aluft@cgsh.com
A .	MASS MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE CO., et al Defendants.	11	-
	Adv. No: 03-92682(AJG)	12	PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON, LLF
	100 Renaissance Center, Suite 3600 Detroit, Michigan	13	Attorneys for Citigroup and Banco Nacional De Mexico
	June 11, 2007	14	1285 Avenue of the Americas
	9:52 a.m.	15	New York, New York 10019-6064
	Videotaped Deposition of SANDRA WARREN SALAC, pursuant to Order, before Kathryn L.	16	BY: BENJAMIN PARK, ESQ.
	Vanes, a Notary Public of the State of Michigan.	17	(Via teleconference)
	ELLEN GRAUER COURT REPORTING CO. LLC	18	PHONE 212-373-2102
	126 East 56th Street, Fifth Floor New York, New York 10022	19	FAX 212-757-3990
	212-750-6434 REF: 84315	20	E-MAIL bpark@paulweiss.com
		21	
		22	
		23	
		24	
		25	
	Page 2		Page 4
1 A	PPEARANCES:		1 APPEARANCES: (Cont'd)
2	T EMANUELS.		2 (College College Col
	ENABLE, LLP		PEPPER HAMILTON, LLP
	ttorneys for Enron Corp.		4 Attorneys for Kelly Properties
5	575 7th Street, NW		5 100 Renaissance Center, Suite 3600
6	Washington, DC 20004-1601	-	Detroit, Michigan 48243
	Y: MOXILA A. UPADHYAYA, ESQ.		7 BY: DEBORAH KOVSKY-APAP, ESQ.
8	ROBERT L. WILKINS, ESQ.		B DAVID MURPHY, ESQ.
9	PHONE 202-344-4319		9 PHONE 313-259-1157
10	FAX 202-344-8300	1	
11	E-MAIL maupadhyaya@venable.com	1	
12			2
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	ttorneys for Lehman Commercial Paper, Inc.	1	
15	One Liberty Plaza	1	
16	New York, New York 10006-1470	1	
	Y: MICHELLE KENNEY, ESQ.	1	
18	(Via Teleconference)	1	
19	PHONE 212-225-2436	1	
20	FAX 212-225-3999	2	
21	E-MAIL mkenney@cgsh.com		1
22		2	_
		2.	2
23		2	
23 24		2 2 2	3
23			

	Page 153		Page 155
1	GALAC	1	GALAC
02:21:45 2	A. No.	02:24:10 2	A. Do I see it?
02:21:46 3	Q. Now, if you compare would you agree with me that	02:24:12 3	BY MS. UPADHYAYA:
02:21:56 4	the strike that.	02:24:12 4	Q. Yes.
02:21:57 5	Do you see at the top of the document it	02:24:12 5	A. Yeah.
02:21:59 6	has it says: Goldman Sachs & Co. notification of	02:24:12 6	Q. Do you understand what that means?
02:22:09 7	secondary purchase; do you see that?	02:24:14 7	A. No.
02:22:11 8	A. Yes.	02:24:15 8	Q. In October of 2001, did you have an understanding of
02:22:11 9	Q. And the date on this document is October 29, 2001,	02:24:18 9	what it meant for a dealer to act as agent for an
02:22:1510	correct?	02:24:2010	issuer?
02:22:1511	A. Yes.	02:24:2111	A. No.
02:22:1612	Q. And under the date, do you see where it says: We	02:24:2112	Q. Do you have an understanding today of what it means to
02:22:2213	bought the following commercial paper, on the top	02:24:2413	act as agent?
02:22:2814	right-hand corner?	02:24:2514	•
02:22:2915	A. Yes, yes.	02:24:2515	MS. KOVSKY-APAP: Objection, asked and
02:22:3116	Q. That this appears to be a purchase by Goldman Sachs &	02:24:2716	answered.
02:22:3717	Co. of Enron commercial paper. At the bottom, it says	02:24:3417	BY MS. UPADHYAYA:
02:22:4118	it's bought from Kelly Properties, Inc.; is that	02:24:4118	Q. Ms. Galac, did anyone at Goldman Sachs & Company ever
02:22:4719	correct?	02:24:4619	inform you it was acting as agent for Enron in 2001?
02:22:4720	MR. LUFT: Objection, form and foundation.	02:24:5020	MR. LUFT: Objection, lack of foundation.
02:22:4821	The document speaks for itself.	02:24:5221	A. Since I didn't talk to Goldman.
02:22:5022	A. I could only say that's what the document looks like,	02:24:5622	BY MS. UPADHYAYA:
02:22:5223	right.	02:24:5623	Q. So the answer is?
02:23:0524	BY MS. UPADHYAYA:	02:24:5724	A. It would be no, right.
02:23:0525	Q. Now, if you compare Exhibit 10,010 to Exhibit 10,012,	02:24:5825	Q. Do you know whether anyone at Goldman Sachs & Company
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
-	Page 154		Page 156
1	GALAC	1 02:25:02 2	GALAC
02:23:12 2 02:23:17 3	do you see on Exhibit 10,010 there is listed a CUSIP		informed Ms. Colombi that it was acting as agent for
	number under the words Enron Corp.?	02:25:05 3	Enron Corp.?
02:23:19 4	A. Yes.	02:25:06 4	MR. LUFT: Objection, lack of foundation.
02:23:20 5	Q. And that CUSIP number is 29356AZ3C?	02:25:08 5	A. She certainly never told me anything like that.
02:23:26 6	A. Yes.	02:25:17 6	BY MS. UPADHYAYA:
02:23:27 7 02:23:32 8	Q. Do you see that same CUSIP number on Exhibit 10,012?		Q. Did you have any understanding in October of 2001 whether Goldman was acting as agent or principal with
02:23:32 6	A. Yes, the A is a little hard to read, but I think it's	02:25:20 8	respect to Enron commercial paper?
	the same, yeah.		
02:23:3610	Q. So it appears that Exhibit 10,012 is reflecting	02:25:2510	
02:23:4211	Goldman's purchase of the same Enron commercial paper that Kelly had bought from Goldman on October 10th?	02:25:3111	MS. KOVSKY-APAP: Counsel on the phone, car
02:23:4412	A. Yes.	02:25:3312	you please mute? BY MS. UPADHYAYA:
02:23:5013			
02:23:5014	MR. LUFT: Objection, form and foundation. Misstates the record and the documents.	02:25:5514	Q. Okay. This is Enron Tab 25. Ms. Galac, I'm showing you a document that's been previously marked in this
02:23:5215	BY MS. UPADHYAYA:	02:26:0215	
02:23:5416	Q. Now, do you see on the bottom right-hand corner,	02:26:0416	-
02:23:5417	Ms. Galac, where it says: Goldman Sachs & Co. acted	02:26:0717	
02:23:5618	as agent for Enron Corp.?	02:26:0818	
02:24:0419		02:26:0819	·
	MS. KOVSKY-APAP: We are looking at Exhibit 10,012 now?		, ,
02:24:0921	MS. UPADHYAYA: 10,012.	02:26:1521	
02:24:0922	·	02:26:2122	A. This is something this is actually from Bank One, if I'm reading this correctly, and it's an account
02:24:0923	COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry, did you say Goldman acted as?	02:26:3523	
02:24:0924			
02:24:1025	MS. UPADHYAYA: Agent for Enron Corp.	02:26:5325	it's a bank statement, as it says.



Page 1	Page 3
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT	1 APPEARANCES (Continued):
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	2
In Re: Enron	3 WHITE & CASE, LLP
ENRON CORP., et al.,	Attorneys for UBS Defendants
Reorganizing Debtors.	4 and the Witness
Chapter 11 Case No. 01-16034 (AJG)	1155 Avenue of the Americas New York, New York 10036-2787
ENRON CORP., Plaintiff,	6 BY: JOHN H. CHUNG, ESQ.
-against-	Phone: (212) 819-8591
J.P. MORGAN SECURITIES INC., et al., Defendants.	7 E-mail: Jchung@whitecase.com
Adv. No. 03-92677 (AJG)	-and-
ENRON CORP., Plaintiff,	8 SARAH NYE CAMPBELL, ESQ.
-against- MASS MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE CO., et al.,	-and- 9 YARIV PIERCE, Paralegal
Defendants.	10
Adv No.: 03-92682 (AJG)	11
1155 Avenue of the	12
Americas	13 VENABLE LLP
New York, New York	Attorneys for ENRON CORP.
January 22, 2007 9:35 a.m.	14 405 Lexington Avenue 56th Floor
	15 New York, New York 10174
VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF MARY MAY before	16 BY: EDMUND M. O'TOOLE, ESQ.
Fran Insley, a Notary Public of the States of New York and New Jersey.	Phone: (212) 307-5500
	17 Fax: (212) 307-5598
ELLEN GRAUER COURT REPORTING CO. LLC 126 East 56th Street, Fifth Floor	E-mail: Emotoole@venable.com
New York, New York 10022 212-750-6434	19
REF: 83037	20
	21
	22
	23
	24 25
Page 2	Page 4
1 APPEARANCES:	_
2 AFFEARANCES.	1 APPEARANCES (Continued):
3 CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN &	3 VENABLE LLP
HAMILTON, ESQS.	Attorneys for Enron Corp.
4 Attorneys for LEHMAN COMMERCIAL	4 Two Hopkins Plaza
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6	BY: DANNETTE R. EDWARDS, ESQ.
BY: RAJA RAGHUNATH, ESQ.	6 Phone: (410) 244-7642
7 Phone: (212) 225-2328	E-mail: Dredwards@venable.com
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9	8
10	9
11 CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN &	10 ALSO PRESENT:
HAMILTON, ESQS. 12 Attorneys for Goldman Sachs	11 SEVEADTH & SHAW LLD
& Co.	12 SEYFARTH & SHAW, LLP 13 BY: CHRISTOL PAETSCH, ESQ.
13 One Liberty Plaza	(Via telephone)
New York, New York 10006-1470	(v la telephone)
14 DV MARIA OCTROVCKY ECO	15
BY: MARIA OSTROVSKY, ESQ. 15 Phone: (212) 225-2363	16
Fax: (212) 225-2363 Fax: (212) 225-3999	17 ALSO PRESENT:
16 E-mail: Mostrovsky@cgsh.com	18
17	19 DAMIEN BARTELS
18	Videographer
19	20
20 21	21
22	22 xxxxx
	23
23	
23 24 25	23 24 25

1 MAY 12:40:25 2 specifics of this transaction with anybody 12:40:27 3 within the short-term unit on or about this 12:40:30 4 date? 12:42:48 4 Q Again, I believe you mer 12:40:31 5 A No, not specifically. 12:40:34 6 Q Do you recall any general 12:40:36 7 conversations you had with Mr. Markowitz about 12:42:57 7 A Correct.	
12:40:27 3 within the short-term unit on or about this 12:40:30 4 date? 12:40:31 5 A No, not specifically. 12:40:34 6 Q Do you recall any general 12:42:45 3 remember it being the afternoon. 12:42:48 4 Q Again, I believe you mend to do that trade; is that contains the contains and the contains the conta	
12:40:27 3 within the short-term unit on or about this 12:40:30 4 date? 12:40:31 5 A No, not specifically. 12:40:34 6 Q Do you recall any general 12:42:45 3 remember it being the afternoon. 12:42:48 4 Q Again, I believe you mend to do that trade; is that contains the contains and the contains the conta	
12:40:30 4 date? 12:40:31 5 A No, not specifically. 12:40:34 6 Q Do you recall any general 12:42:48 4 Q Again, I believe you mend to do that trade; is that contains the contains and the contains the contains and the contains the contains and the contains the conta	
12:40:31 5 A No, not specifically. 12:40:35 5 earlier that you didn't need author 12:40:36 6 Q Do you recall any general 12:42:55 6 anyone to do that trade; is that co	ntioned
12:40:34 6 Q Do you recall any general 12:42:55 6 anyone to do that trade; is that co	
12:40:39 8 deciding to sell the Enron commercial paper 12:43:02 8 Q Let's skip a couple of page	ges ahead
12:40:41 9 that you managed on this particular date? 12:43:06 9 still, and it bears, "Goldman Sacl	
12:40:43 10 A I don't specifically remember 12:43:12 10 in the upper left-hand corner, and	
12:40:45 11 talking to him, but sort of the normal protocol 12:43:19 11 couple of lines below on the left	
12:40:48 12 would have been to discuss it with him, 12:43:20 12 "Notification of secondary purch	
12:40:51 13 although I wouldn't have to but it's likely 12:43:24 13 Do you recall ever seeing	
12:40:55 14 that I did, but I can't specifically recall 12:43:26 14 document before?	tills
	a a document
12:41:00 16 Q To the right of underneath the 12:43:27 16 Q Do you recall ever seeing 12:41:02 17 left-hand block it says, "Trade executed." It 12:43:30 17 like this before?	g a document
1	a la alrad
	t something i
12:41:14:20 stamp signifies, to the best of your knowledge? 12:43:37:20 regularly look at.	
12:41:20 21 A I'm not sure if that refers to when 12:43:39 21 Q At the very bottom on th	
12:41:21 22 the trade ticket is actually generated and sent 12:43:41 22 corner it says, "Goldman Sachs &	& Company acted
12:41:24 23 over to the operations group or if it's the 12:43:43 23 as agent for Enron Corporation.	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
12:41:26 24 trade on our trade tickets we do put in what 12:43:47 24 Do you remember discuss	
12:41:31 25 time the trade was actually executed. The fact 12:43:47 25 anyone at UBS whether or not G	foldman Sachs was
Page 118	Page 120
1 MAY 1 MAY	
12:41:35 2 that this goes out to more decimals is making 12:43:51 2 acting as an agent for Enron in	
12:41:39 3 me think it's referring to when the ticket was 12:43:56 3 commercial paper of Enron tha	it you managed?
12:41:41 4 generated, not the trade, but I'm not positive. 12:43:59 4 MR. RAGHUNATH: C	•
12:41:43 5 Q Do you typically have to physically 12:44:01 5 A I don't know of any dis	cussion like
12:41:46 6 input the time a trade is made from your 12:44:03 6 that.	
12:41:49 7 standpoint, or is it done automatically? 12:44:03 7 Q Do you recall the term	being used in
12:41:55 8 A I don't know if we did then. I 12:44:05 8 the context of the Enron paper	transaction of
12:41:58 9 think we did. I know that we do now. We have 12:44:09 9 October 26, 2001?	
12:42:0010 to put the time the trade was executed into our 12:44:1010 A No, I don't.	
12:42:1011 FIST system. I'm not positive that we did 12:44:1111 Q You don't recall discus	sing it with
12:42:10 12 that, but I'm pretty sure we did. 12:44:13 12 anyone at Goldman Sachs; is the	nat correct, the
12:42:1213 Q We just now looked at four different 12:44:1713 term "agent"?	
12:42:1514 commercial, Enron commercial paper sales 12:44:2114 A I have no recollection of	of discussing
12:42:2015 transactions on the 26th. Do you recall 12:44:2415 the term "agent," no.	-
12:42:23 16 whether those trades were done at different 12:44:25 16 Q With anyone from Gold	dman Sachs?
12:42:2517 times on the 26th? 12:44:2717 A No.	
12:42:2618 MS. OSTROVSKY: Objection. Lack of 12:44:4018 MR. O'TOOLE: Let's g	go to tab 21.
12:42:2919 foundation. 12:44:5719 This will become Exhibit 20	
12:42:3020 A I don't remember. I know that I 12:45:1120 it appears to be an e-mail from	
12:42:3221 certainly did my trade after Debbie's trade 12:45:1221 Graham at Chase. Then the	
12:42:3622 because she received word first, but other than 12:45:2522 documents behind it, but I'n	n really just
12:42:3623 that, I can't tell you for sure. 12:45:2823 concerned with the first pag	
12:42:4024 Q Do you recall whether you did the 13:36:4024 (Whereupon an e-mail f	
12:42:4225 trade in the afternoon or the morning? 13:36:4025 Graham to Kevin Fiori at Cl	



VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF MICHAEL MARKOWITZ CONDUCTED ON THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 2006

Page 1	Page 3
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT	1 APPEARANCES
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	2
In Re Enron : Chapter 11 ENRON CORP., et al., : Case No. 01-16034(AJG) Reorganized Debtors. : Jointly Administered	3 ON BEHALF OF ENRON CORP.:
Reorganized Debtors. : Jointly Administered	4 EDMUND M. O'TOOLE, ESQUIRE
ENRON CORP., :	5 VENABLE LLP
Plaintiff, : v. : Adv. No. 03-92677(AJG)	6 405 Lexington Avenue, 56th Floor
J.P. MORGAN SECURITIES : INC., et al., :	7 New York, New York 10174
Defendants :	8 (212) 307-5500
(Caption continued on page two)	9 -and-
Videotaped Deposition of MICHAEL MARKOWITZ	10 DANETTE RAE EDWARDS, ESQUIRE
New York, New York Thursday, November 30, 2006	11 VENABLE LLP
9:38 a.m.	
Job No.: 1-90891 Pages 1 through 186	
Reported by: Patricia Mulligan Carruthers, CSR	2 Hopkins Plaza
	Baltimore, Maryland 21201
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	16
	17
	ON BEHALF OF CITIBANK, N.A.; CITI INSTITUTIONAL
	19 CORPORATE & MORTGAGE BOND FUND; AND BANCO NACIONA
	20 DE MEXICO:
	21 MICHAEL A. ECKER, ESQUIRE
	PAUL WEISS RIFKIND WHARTON & GARRISON LLP
	23 1285 Avenue of the Americas
	New York, New York 10019
	25 (212) 373-3000
Page 2	Page 4
1 (Caption continued from previous page)	1 APPEARANCES CONTINUED
2x	2
3 ENRON CORP., :	ON BEHALF OF GOLDMAN, SACHS & CO.; LEHMAN
4 Plaintiff, :	4 COMMERCIAL PAPER, INC., and BRAHMS
5 v. :	5 FUNDING CORPORATION:
6 MASS MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE : Adv. No. 03-92682(AJG)	6 STUART MAST, ESQUIRE
7 CO., et al., :	7 MARIA OSTROVSKY, ESQUIRE
8 Defendants. :	8 CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON
9x	9 One Liberty Plaza
10	10 New York, New York 10006
11 Videotaped Deposition of MICHAEL MARKOWITZ,	11 (212) 225-2000
12 held at the offices of:	12
13	13
14 WHITE & CASE LLP	14 ON BEHALF OF THE NORTHERN BANKING CUSTOMERS
15 1155 Avenue of the Americas	15 CHRISTOPHER E. PAETSCH, ESQUIRE
16 New York, New York 10036	16 SEYFARTH SHAW LLP
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18	18 Chicago, Illinois 60603
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20	20 (Present via Telephone)
21 Pursuant to agreement, before Patricia Mulligan	21
1	
· · · ·	
 Carruthers, Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public of the State of New Jersey and Notary Public of the State of New York. 	22 23 24 25

1 (Pages 1 to 4)

VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF MICHAEL MARKOWITZ CONDUCTED ON THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 2006

	Page 77		Page 79
1	M. MARKOWITZ	1	M. MARKOWITZ
11:39:50 2	A I remember a time when we sold commercial	11:43:20 2	commercial paper, will have a CUSIP.
11:39:53 3	paper and Goldman, Sachs purchased commercial paper.	11:43:33 3	Q Do you recall during this time frame, again,
11:39:56 4	Q And that time was at the end of October?	11:43:37 4	end of October, 2001, whether anyone from Goldman,
11:39:58 5	A I would assume so.	11:43:42 5	Sachs ever indicated to anyone in your group that it
11:40:05 6	Q Okay. How would UBS reflect the transaction	11:43:46 6	was acting as an agent for Enron Corporation in
11:40:10 7	whereby it had sold commercial paper to Goldman in the	11:43:49 7	repurchasing commercial paper from UBS?
11:40:15 8	time frame October, 2001?	11:43:53 8	MR. PELL: Objection.
11:40:18 9	MS. OSTROVSKY: Objection to form.	11:43:56 9	A I don't know that. I don't recall.
11:40:2010	A Reflected in what way?	11:44:0710	Q Do you know who, if anyone, at UBS at the end
11:40:2111	Q What type of documentation would generate on	11:44:1411	of October had a particular conversation with anyone
11:40:2512	UBS's end when a sale like that occurred?	11:44:2012	from Goldman, Sachs about Goldman, Sachs's decision to
11:40:2913	MS. OSTROVSKY: Objection. Foundation.	11:44:2513	repurchase Enron commercial paper from UBS?
11:40:3014	A We would typically put in a sales ticket	11:44:2814	MR. PELL: Objection.
11:40:3515	which would go to our operational area. They would	11:44:3015	MS. OSTROVSKY: Objection.
11:40:4116	They would talk with the counterparty.	11:44:3116	MR. MAST: Objection to form and foundation.
11:40:4517	Q The operations area would typically do that?	11:44:3417	A I believe it was Mary Wilson.
11:40:4718	A Well, after the sale is made between	11:44:3918	Q Do you know if UBS tapes its telephone
11:40:5119	ourselves and our counterparty either vocally or	11:44:5219	communications with broker/dealers?
11:40:5920	electronically, we would then put in a ticket which	11:44:5620	A I don't believe we do.
11:41:0221	would go to our operations area. Our operations area	11:44:5621	MR. O'TOOLE: Trying to move ahead a little
11:41:0822	will then confirm the trade.	11:45:2422	bit. We're going to go to what's predesignated Tab
11:41:1123	Q How would it confirm the trade, if you know?	11:45:2923	25.
11:41:1324	A They would call the similar back office of a	11:45:2924	MR. PELL: Does he need to change the tape?
11:41:1625	broker/dealer and confirm the sale or the purchase as	11:45:3325	MR. O'TOOLE: Yes.
	oronor, dearer and commit the sare of the parenase as	11.10.0020	Mit. o 10022. Tes.
	Page 78		Page 80
1	Page 78	1	Page 80
1	M. MARKOWITZ	1	M. MARKOWITZ
11:41:22 2	M. MARKOWITZ far as dollars and such.	11:45:33 2	M. MARKOWITZ THE VIDEOGRAPHER: This marks the end of Tape
11:41:22 2 11:41:30 3	M. MARKOWITZ far as dollars and such. Q During the normal course of your	11:45:33 2 11:45:36 3	M. MARKOWITZ THE VIDEOGRAPHER: This marks the end of Tape Number 1 in the deposition of Mr. Mike Markowitz.
11:41:22 2 11:41:30 3 11:41:32 4	M. MARKOWITZ far as dollars and such. Q During the normal course of your responsibilities in this time frame, October, 2001,	11:45:33 2 11:45:36 3 11:45:39 4	M. MARKOWITZ THE VIDEOGRAPHER: This marks the end of Tape Number 1 in the deposition of Mr. Mike Markowitz. We're going off the record. The time is 11:45 a.m.
11:41:22 2 11:41:30 3 11:41:32 4 11:41:36 5	M. MARKOWITZ far as dollars and such. Q During the normal course of your responsibilities in this time frame, October, 2001, did you typically review sales tickets as they were	11:45:33 2 11:45:36 3 11:45:39 4 11:45:45 5	M. MARKOWITZ THE VIDEOGRAPHER: This marks the end of Tape Number 1 in the deposition of Mr. Mike Markowitz. We're going off the record. The time is 11:45 a.m. (Whereupon, a recess is taken.)
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